Comprehension and retention of prose : a literature review by Reder, Lynne M.
Hs
I LI NO S
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
PRODUCTION NOTE
University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign Library
Large-scale Digitization Project, 2007.

Technical Report No. 108
COMPREHENSION AND RETENTION OF PROSE:
A LITERATURE REVIEW
Lynne M. Reder
Carnegie-Mellon University
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
November 1978
Center for the Study of Reading
A£ L R1 ARY OF TO ;
OCT 7 1981
AT pOr 4A`4 u Is
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS
AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
51 Gerty Drive
Champaign, Illinois 61820
BOLT BERANEK AND NEWMAN INC.
50 Moulton Street
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138
T
E
C
H
N
I
C
A
L
R
E
P
0
R
T
S
Hea
jnsd/
I

Technical Report No. 108
COMPREHENSION AND RETENTION OF PROSE:
A LITERATURE REVIEW
Lynne M. Reder
Carnegie-Mellon University
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
November 1978
University of Illinois
at Urbana-Champaign
51 Gerty Drive
Champaign, Illinois 61820
Bolt Beranek and Newman Inc.
50 Moulton Street
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138
The research reported herein was supported by the National Institute
of Education under Contract No. US-NIE-C-400-76-0116.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction ............................................... .............. 1
1. Investigations of Factors that Affect Amount of Recall............... 5
1.1 Focus on Instructionally Relevant Experiments................... 5
1.2 Research Using Additional Context as External Aids.............. 11
1.3 Investigations that test the Generalizability of Verbal
Learning Results to Connected Discourse......................... 16
1.4 Discussion...................................................... 20
2. Representations of Text Structures.................................. 21
2.1 Representations of Logical Relations........................... 22
2.1.1 Dawes .................................................... 22
2.1.2 Crothers................................................. 23
2.1.3 Frederiksen.............................................. 25
2.2 Representations Concerned with More Complex Relations........... 28
2.2.1 Frederiksen.............................................. 28
2.2.2 Kintsch.................................................. 30
2.2.3 Meyer .................................................... 35
2.3 Formal Models of Text Structure................................. 40
2.3.1 Theory of Discourse and Macro-structures................. 41
2.4 Story Grammars .................................................. 46
2.4.1 Rumelhart................................................ 46
2.4.2 Thorndyke ....... ............. .......................... . 50
2.4.3 Mandler and Johnson...................................... 51
2.4.4 Stein and Glenn.......................................... 53
2.4.5 Discussion of Story Grammars............................. 55
3. Use of World Knowledge to Aid Comprehension.......................... 58
3.1 Schemata, Frames and Prototypes................................. 58
3.2 Necessary Inferences....................... ..................... 60
3.2.1 Clark.................................................... 61
3.2.2 Schank's Model for Drawing Inferences.................... 63
3.3 Scripts, Plans and Goals........................................ 65
3.4 The Script-Elaboration Model................................... 70
3.5 Experimental Evidence in Support of the Elaboration Theory...... 74
3.6 Di scussion....................................................... 80
4. General Conclusions and Implications for Education................... 82
4.1 Summing Up ...................................................... 84
Reference Note ........................................................... 86
Bibliography................ ........................................... 87
Footnotes ................................................................. 102
Comprehension and Retention of Prose
INTRODUCTION
In the last 5 years, an interest in studying prose comprehension and
retention has been rekindled among cognitive psychologists. The psychologist
generally credited with first studying memory for stories was Bartlett (1932).
His early research is still frequently cited and still influences the field.
In his experiments, subjects read stories from different cultures, which they
later recalled. The main finding was that recall was inaccurate; elements
of the story which were poorly understood for cultural reasons were distorted
in recall to conform better with his subjects' knowledge. He considered his
results incompatible with the notion of "fixed lifeless traces" and instead
posited that remembering is a constructive process based on general impres-
sions and attitudes.
For approximately 30 years, since Bartlett's seminal work, psychologists
left.the investigation of reading to researchers in education. Instead,
psychologists looked at memory for lists of nonsense syllables, words and
unrelated sentences. One reason psychologists may have shied away from
studying prose is the problems inherent in using large units of analysis.
With large units of analysis, experimenters often feel that they have less
control over the subject's processing of the material. Thorndyke (1975),
for example, states that language comprehension involves "integration of
incoming language into the situation or context..., use of previously
learned world knowledge, the generation of inferences... (and) of expecta-
tions...(p.2)." However, this feeling of more control with CVC's is illusory,
I think: To the extent that subjects are successful at remembering CVC's,
word lists, etc., they are using their long-term memory in unpredictable
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ways to create mnemonics and integrate them into a "meaningful structure,"
(Montague, Adams & Kiess, 1966; Prytulak, 1971). If anything, the ex-
perimenter should have a better idea of the nature of subjects' processing
with paragraph material.
Another reason experimenters have shied away from using prose material
is the difficulty in determining the similarity and differences among
passages. This makes comparisons across experiments that use prose difficult.
There have been two main dependent measures employed in the study of prose
comprehension and retention: question answering and free recall of the
passage. Anderson (1972) has argued that not enough attention has been
placed on the selection of questions that are intended to measure compre-
hension. Just as it is difficult to evaluate the similarity of prose
passages, it is difficult to score recall of prose in a meaningful way to
determine how much has been retained.
The new willingness to study prose comprehension, despite its problems
of imprecision is due to several factors. First of all, some investigators
have lost faith in the idea that results from simple laboratory experiments
2
will generalize to natural materials. Second, it is now easier to conduct
research and develop theories related to reading than it was a few years
ago, due to the developments in computer science and linguistics.
Computers are an aid to the study of prose in two ways. Paragraphs can
now be presented to the subject "on-line" (on the computer TV monitors),
each sentence displayed for only the time a specific subject needs to read
it. Reading times can be recorded, questions can be asked at any desired
point, eye movements can be monitored, speed/accuracy in answering the
questions can be manipulated and so on. Computers are also an aid to
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theoretical development as they allow simulation of prose processing. It
would be very difficult to develop a model of prose processing in much
detail without implementing it on a computer as the complexity is not con-
ceptually tractable. Another reason theorists have returned to prose
processing is the concomitant development of text grammars in linguistics
(e.g., Lakoff, 1972). Psychologists and simulators use theoretical notions
from linguistics to suggest experiments or ways to simulate. Linguistics
is also influenced by work done in the other two fields.
There are other groups of investigators apart from cognitive psycholo-
gists who have been studying prose. Researchers in the field of education
have been exploring this issue for many years (e.g., Ausubel, Frase, Gagne,
Rothkopf). Memory theorists who have uncovered a number of principles
using the "verbal learning materials" (e.g., lists of nonsense syllables or
words) have investigated to what extent the principles generalize to con-
nected discourse.
One of the problems, of course, in studying prose comprehension is the
need to pare down the morass of complexities associated with prose. Thus
far, the strategy to deal with the enormous complexity seems to be to
partition the problem of prose understanding into subproblems and only focus
on one or two aspects, e.g., the structure and grammars of stories, how the
"content" (words and topics) affects recall, how orienting tasks affect
comprehension, or the role of knowledge bundles--scripts or frames--in
understanding.
Hopefully, this problem can be partitioned into different aspects, but
unless investigators are aware of all aspects of the problem, little success
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is likely. For example, those concerned with developing story grammars
should consider what kind of process model or mechanism would enable the
reader to build a representation from a given story using the grammar.
What world knowledge is needed to comprehend the story and how does the
grammar use it? Those concerned with developing "comprehension' or process
models necessarily assume an end representation for the story. Use of a
specified story grammar would facilitate decisions concerning importance
of various aspects of a story when parsed and influence expectations about
material not yet processed from the text.
The first section of this paper will review some of the research that
has focused on applied, practical questions of interest to education. The
results from some of this research indicate the need for a more sophisticated
understanding of text structures and internal representations of text. A
review of current work on text grammars is given, followed by a discussion
of work on processing models. Finally in the last section, we can see how
some of the theoretical work has implications for educational problems/
3
questions, with which we began.
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1. INVESTIGATIONS OF FACTORS THAT AFFECT AMOUNT OF RECALL
1.1 Focus on Instructionally Relevant Experiments
An important application of research dealing with prose processing is
how to improve people's ability to read. Various techniques have been tried
to improve the student's comprehension and retention of reading material.
Carroll (1971) provides an extensive review. Ausubel (1960) introduced the
notion of "advance organizers." He thought that adjunct aids which gave the
reader a preview of the content of the passage would improve the reader's
organization of the material, thus leading to better comprehension and re-
tention. The dvajn-organizers should activate or develop appropriate
cognitive structures to which subjects could anchor the incoming ideas.
An example of his task is to give subjects a passage before the critical
passage. The passage either contains "subsuming" concepts of the critical
passage or is essentially irrelevant to it. He predicted that prior ex-
posure to subsuming concepts of "anchors" would facilitate retention.
Ausubel and his associates (e.g., Ausubel & Fitzgerald, 1962) have found
data to be consistent with these notions to some extent; they admit, however,
that an advance organizer's usefulness interacts with many other variables
such as previous knowledge and verbal ability.
Although many researchers agree that Ausubel's work provided interest-
ing speculations that stimulated others to pursue similar questions, he
has been criticized for lack of appropriate experimental controls and lack
of objective measures of his stimulus variables (see Frase, 1975). It is
difficult to test the notion that previous exposure to the high level
concepts of a passage will improve retention of lower level concepts when
Comprehension and Retention of Prose
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no procedure for evaluating the structure of a passage has been proposed.
Gagne and Wiegand (1970) are examples of investigators who put Ausubel's
conclusions into doubt. They found that improvement in retention due to
Ausubel's advance organizers may have had their facilitation in retrieval,
not in storage. Recall was improved even when the related topic sentence
was not given until just before the test. This is inconsistent with Ausubel's
argument that improvement results from the ability to embed the information
in pre-existing structures.
The investigation of the use of adjunct aids in the comprehension of
prose has been continued by a number of investigators. One such aid that
has been explored thoroughly is the effect of questions on subsequent test
performance (e.g., Anderson & Biddle, 1975; Frase, 1967, 1968, 1971, 1972,
1975; McGaw & Grotelueschen, 1972; Rothkopf, 1966, 1972; Rothkopf & Bisbicos,
1967; Watts & Anderson, 1971; see Anderson & Biddle for an extensive review).
The typical dependent measure is how well a subject can answer a set of
questions about a passage (call these test questions) as a function of having
been asked questions about the passage earlier (call these priming ques-
tions). Examples of the independent variables are whether the priming
questions are asked before the subject reads the passage, during the passage
or after the passage; whether the priming questions are general or specific;
whether the subject is given feedback on the priming questions.
The majority of the studies in the field have found that subjects do
better at answering a test question if they have been asked that same
question earlier. The improvement obtains regardless of whether the priming
question was given before the passage was read or afterwards and whether or not
the subject was given feedback about his answer. Performance is best if
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the question was asked before the passage was read. In the case where
priming questions ask about information different from that to be tested,
the findings are mixed: subjects do better on the to-be-tested questions
than controls who have not seen priming questions only when the priming
questions were asked after the passage was read. If the priming questions
were asked prior to reading the text, performance is occasionally worse
for experimental subjects than it is for controls (who have not seen the
primes).
Priming questions provide a focus that tells the subject what aspects
of the text are important. However, providing a focus can not be the
entire explanation of the improvement due to priming questions. The loca-
tion of priming questions is also important. Frase (1968) found that
asking a question after each paragraph is superior to asking all the priming
questions at the end of the passage. Frase (1967) also found that asking
a priming question after two paragraphs was better than after one or four.
If the effect of priming questions were merely to provide a focus, then
the position of questions should not matter.
It seems that priming questions do more than provide focus; they force
the subject to process the text in a certain way. This is clear from
results of experiments where critical aspects of the text were directly
highlighted (in a box) at study. Bruning's (1968) study found that this
method of highlighting was not nearly as effective as forcing the subject
to answer a question that caused that material to be reviewed in order to
answer it. The conclusion that providing information may not be as effective
as forcing the subject to retrieve it himself has been encountered before.
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Bobrow and Bower (1969) found that providing the mnemonic to relate a pair
of words was not nearly as effective as asking subjects to provide one
themselves.
Frase (1967) suggested that priming questions cause the subject to
review the relevant aspects of the passage. This review process probably
involves more than merely stating the critical information in the question
or answer since highlighting the critical information was so much less
effective. Indeed, McGaw and Grotelueschen (1972) found that the infor-
mation does not need to be directly tested. In their study, when a question
reminded a subject of information present in the text, without either stat-
ing the information in the question or demanding it as an answer, subjects
later recalled that fact better than a comparable fact unrelated to the
priming question. The reason that priming questions in studies mentioned
earlier for the most part only helped same questions and not new test
questions is probably due to the nature of the overlap between questions.
In fact, Reder (1976) and Watts and Anderson (1971) both conducted experiments
in which priming questions helped some new test questions and not others,
depending on the type of questions or the type of relation between priming
and test questions.
It seems clear that merely asking a question will not produce improved
performance. The question must force the subject to process relevant aspects
of the text in "useful" ways. Watts and Anderson (1971), for example, found
that subjects do better on a post-test about passages they read if they had
been asked immediately after reading each passage a question that forced
them to "integrate" the material (i.e., apply a principle in the passage to
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a new example). On the other hand, subjects do even worse on the post-test
if asked a low-level question (name the scientist associated with the prin-
ciple) than if asked no question at all.
One explanation for this result involves the notion of generating
useful elaborations. This notion is that the more extra processing one
does that results in additional, related or redundant propositions, the
better will be memory for the material processed. The importance of rele-
vant elaborations or embellishments to memory has been argued elsewhere
(Reder, 1976) and will be discussed in more depth in section 3. Elabora-
tions provide redundancy in the memory structure. Redundancy can be viewed
as a safe-guard against forgetting and an aid to fast retrieval. In the
Watts and Anderson study, when subjects were asked no questions they probably
had more time to generate useful elaborations than when they were forced to
generate the name of the scientist which has nothing to do with the point
of the principle. In other words, it is not enough to force people to think
about the relevant information, they must generate semantically useful
elaborations; if they think about aspects of the text that seem trivial and
unimportant (e.g., when reading about how electricity works, thinking about
the cost of electricity today), then they will not be able to answer ques-
tions about aspects of the passage that are deemed important.
Rothkopf (1972) conducted a study whose results are consistent with
this view. In this study subjects read material at their own rate and they
would read slower those passages for which they were given priming questions.
They probably were attending (thinking, elaborating) more to the relevant
information in primed passages. Anderson and Biddle (1975) also produced
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results consistent with thenotion of greater amount of attention producing
better performance. In their experiments subjects were asked a priming
question after reading the passage that could either test verbatim memory
or gist memory. They found that a priming test of verbatim memory produced
better subsequent performance on either a verbatim or paraphrase test than
did a previous paraphrase memory test. If one assumes that one makes
multiple redundant elaborations related to a statement during study, finding
anyone will suffice for a gist recall test. However, to decide if something
was said in that exact form requires a much more thorough search of one's
memory representation. Perhaps verbatim search, being more time consuming,
allows more elaborations to be rehearsed (strengthened) and more new ones
to be generated.
The extra elaboration notion mentioned above seems consistent with
most of the results thus far. There is some data, however, collected by
Frase (1968, 1975) and Rothkopf and Kaplan (1972) that seems both unintuitive
and difficult for the extra elaboration interpretation. Subjects were found
to perform better on new test questions if the priming questions are more
specific (e.g., "When was Jack born?") than when they are general (e.g.,
"When were the men in the paragraph born?"). Presumably, more general
questions would cause more elaborate "general discussion" questions. On
the other hand, at least some of the results used to argue for the superiority
of specific questions are suspect. For example, one task used by Frase
(1975) is unlike those tasks to which he wishes to generalize. Subjects'
instructions were to either underline the names of all living creatures or
of all land animals: the names to be underlined were either category names
Comprehension and Retention of Prose
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or the animal's proper name in the story, e.g., "Jelly." These words were
embedded in a story about a king who was in charge of naming all the animals.
Frase was interested in the time to perform the task and the amount of
recall of animal category names; he did not ask for recall of the story.
This experiment seemed to be a verbal learning task and, in fact, was a
replication of an earlier study (Frase & Kammann, 1974) that did not
have subjects read a story. When subjects underlined every noun or every
capitalized noun ("proper noun"), the task involved only low-level processing
(Hyde & Jenkins, 1973; Craik & Lockhart, 1972) and was performed faster.
In the conditions where subjects recalled more, they took more time and
had to process words at a deeper level (consistent with the "extra thought
processing" notion). The task is unlike a normal reading task.
The research discussed thus far has dealt principally with how to
improve retention of prose material. Forcing readers to attend to those
aspects of the passage that are deemed important results in better reten-
tion of that information. This research has focused less on how people
come to comprehend a passage or why various techniques improve performance.
The apparent inconsistency in results among some of this research probably
stems from our inadequate understanding of the structure of passages, how
content is represented and how it is processed and integrated with prior
knowledge. Subsequent sections will review recent attempts to improve
our understanding.
1.2 Research Using Additional Context as External Aids
The research of Bransford and Dooling illustrate the importance of a
relevant conceptual structure within which to embed new information for
Comprehension and Retention of Prose
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long-term retention of the input. Like the research discussed in the
last section, this work explores the usefulness of adjunct aids. In this
work, the adjunct aids have consisted of pictures, titles, topic phrases,
etc. rather than questions. The goal of the research has been less con-
cerned with techniques to improve recall (although recall has certainly
been affected by the use of the aids), and has been more concerned with
what affects comprehension broadly speaking. In many experiments the
passages used were basically incomprehensible without such aids, while
much clearer when aids were given in advance. The effectiveness of the
aids has been explained in terms of Bartlett's notions of schemata.
Bransford and Johnson (1973) and Bransford and McCarrell (1975) found that
comprehension and ability to remember a passage were greatly improved
when a descriptive title or picture was given prior to the passage. With-
out the title or picture, the passages were too abstract; the referents
needed to understand the passage could only be inferred from the topic in
one case and from the situation depicted in the picture in the other. In
other words, comprehension depended on a schema or conceptual framework
supplied by the experimenter to make the referents of the passage clear.
Dooling and Lachman (1971) also presented passages that were much easier
to recall if a topic (e.g., "The first space trip to the moon:) was given
before reading the passage. Giving the topic after having read the passage
produced no better recall than not giving it at all (Bransford & Johnson,
1973; Dooling & Mullet, 1973). This indicates, I think, that if one cannot
fit the input into a conceptual structure immediately, the phrases will
not be transferred into long-term memory. Thus, the topic is of no use in
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the after condition as the story is already forgotten. It is also the
case that providing the subject with the wrong topic before reading an
abstract passage makes recall worse than having no topic (Bransford &
Johnson, 1973). Perhaps this is because the reader wastes processing time
trying to integrate the input into the wrong structure without success
(i.e., it does not "fit") or creates inappropriate elaborations. Had he
been given no structure, the reader stood a better chance of deriving an
appropriate one. These findings are consistent with Ausubel's suggestion
that the reader profits from being given prior structure on which to map
the incoming material.
Bransford and Franks (1971) argue that in "normal passages," when the
referents are clear, a schematic representation of the input is constructed
and only that schema is stored in memory. They showed that subjects were
poor at discriminating exact sentences they heard from other sentences that
were also derived from the "schema." Bransford and Johnson also showed that
if the passages are concrete, (i.e., the referents are clear), prior know-
ledge of the topic does not aid comprehension or recall. This finding is
not inconsistent with Ausubel's assertion that prior structure helps com-
prehension. He had found that an advance organizer's usefulness interacts
with the reader's knowledge and the subject matter. In some "concrete"
passages for which the reader knows little about the topic, prior exposure
to the structure would undoubtedly improve comprehension and retention.
Perhaps the term "concrete" should be defined with respect to each indivi-
dual's semantic memory since various referents may not seem clear if the
reader is unfamiliar with the topic.
Comprehension and Retention of Prose
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Sulin and Dooling (1974) demonstrated the influence of prior knowledge
in a different manner. They argued for the importance of thematic effects
in retention of prose. When a subject read a passage that was said to be
about a famous person, e.g., Hitler, they were less confident about re-
jecting in a recognition task foils that were dominant traits of the famous
person than less thematically related foils. When subjects were told that
the passage read was about a fictitious character, they rejected all foils
with about the same confidence. Sulin and Dooling were able to find in
one of their two experiments that the "thematicity" effect increased with
delay, as predicted by Bartlett. However, most of these results are open
to potential artifacts: The effect could be merely a response bias rather
than a difference in encoding. To demonstrate that it is not a response
bias, they should have contrasted their results with those from subjects
who were not told the identity of the character (Hitler vs. Gerald Martin)
until the time of test. Unlike a response bias model, a "schema" model
would not predict a replication of their results in the control condition.
This is because according to the schema theory, it is during input that
one reorganizes, interpretes, etc., not at test. It should be pointed out
that subjects rarely false-alarmed (i.e., said the foils had been presented);
they just gave lower confidence ratings about related foils being new than
about less related foils.
More recently, Dooling and Christiaansen (1977) performed the needed
control experiment. The subject was told the identity either before reading
the passage, immediately after reading the passage or immediately before
test at one week. They found that subjects made many false alarms at a
Comprehension and Retention of Prose
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week delay regardless of when they learned the "identity" of the famous
character. The percentage of thematic false alarms was greatest when
subjects were told immediately after reading the story. Neither the
simple response-bias model nor the simple schema model predict the obtained
pattern of data, that the most thematic false alarms occur when subjects
are informed right after reading the story. However, a reconstructive
model plus a type of response bias model together could handle the data.
The model would posit that if the subject learns the identity of the
fictitious character immediately after reading, then the subject will go
back over the story, mentally, reworking it to make it consistent with
the "true" identity. This causes more thematically related inferences to
be stored erroneously than when the subject knows while reading the story
that the passage is about a famous character. A response bias must also
be operating (a pre-disposition to respond in a manner consistent with
knowledge about the famous character) to account for the greater number
of false alarms to thematic foils when told the character's identity
immediately before test.
One interpretation of Sulin and Dooling's result is that subjects
need not store the related facts in long-term memory since the result is
partially a response bias. This view is supported by data of Frase (1970,
1971). When subjects were asked to rate the validity of statements with
respect to a passage, no difference in ratings of inferences and assertions
were found. Frase did find differences in recall, however. Very few in-
ferences tended to be produced. This might be because the inferences were
not made until subjects were asked to judge their validity; or they might
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have been made, but tagged as inferences and not considered appropriate
for recall. The former seems more likely because when subjects were forced
to draw the inference to answer another question, the incidence of the
inference's recall increased.
In conclusion, the findings of Bransford and Dooling discussed earlier,
like Bartlett's, provide evidence that context and general knowledge affect
memory for prose. They go beyond Bartlett's work by showing when "distor-
tion" of memory can occur (i.e., immediately after reading as well as during
reading) and when the requisite knowledge is needed for comprehension and
retention (i.e., it must precede reading). Like Bartlett, however, the
investigators offer few insights as to what the structure of schemas might
be like or the mechanisms that allow schemas to affect comprehension.
Anderson and Biddle (1975) remark with respect to the questioning litera-
ture reviewed in the last section that "We do not need another demonstration
that adjunct questions 'work' . . . [we need to know] . . . why they work
. .. (p. 108)." The same basic comment could be made with respect to
these demonstrations. An explanation for these findings will be given in
section 4.
1.3 Investigations that Test the Generalizability of Verbal Learning Results
to Connected Discourse
The comprehension and retention of prose has also been investigated
from the perspective of how much generalization there will be from research
using smaller units of analysis to this level of analysis. It seems
reasonable to determine whether earlier work is applicable to more natural
settings and to try to make use of the products of past research.
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Proactive inhibition and retroactive inhibition are two classic find-
ings from learning research (see Postman, 1961). Proactive inhibition
occurs when subjects first learn a list of A-B pairs, (i.e., must recall
the 'B' responses to the 'A' stimuli) and are then taught a list of A-C
pairs in which new responses are paired with the old stimuli. Although
subjects can generate the C responses to the same A stimuli, they forget
the C responses faster than a control group that learned an A-B list and
then a D-C list. Retroactive inhibition is the phenomenon that a delayed
recall of the B responses to the A stimuli is worse in the A-B, A-C
condition than in the control A-B, D-C condition. Positive transfer is
another related phenomenon in which learning A-B' is facilitated (learned
quicker) than A-C or D-C when subjects learned A-B first (the B and B'
responses are very similar.)
Interference and positive transfer have both been obtained in recall
of one passage when a second passage has also been studied between its
presentation and test. Whether interference or positive transfer is found
depends on the nature of the overlap of the two (Anderson & Carter, 1972;
Bower, 1974; Myrow & Anderson, 1972; Walker, 1974). Anderson and Carter
found retroactive inhibition in the subjects' ability to recall the subject
of a sentence to the predicate cue. This occurred when a different sentence
containing a paraphrase of the predicate and an unrelated subject were
presented for study between the original sentence's study and test. Walker
obtained retroactive inhibition for recall to a first paragraph after
reading a second related one.
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Bower (1974) investigated which aspects of passage overlap lead to
facilitation and which lead to interference. He found that recall of the
macrostructure (i.e., the general organization and topic of the information
covered) improved if a different passage with the same conceptual macro-
structure was presented between the critical paragraph's presentation and
test. Recall of this macrostructure was improved independent of whether
the intervening passage with the same conceptual macrostructure had the
same microstructure (details) or a different microstructure; recall of the
microstructure, however, was inferior if the microstructures differed (and
the macrostructures were the same).
Organizational factors have been shown to be of importance to recall
of prose just as they have been in free recall of word lists. Not surpris-
Singly, Montague and Carter (1973) found subjects recall more of a passage
which maintains a correct syntactic order than one in which words are pre-
sented in random order. Even in non-scrambled texts, the input organiza-
tion of concepts and their associated attributes can affect the amount
recalled (Frase, 1969, 1975; Myers, Pezdek & Coulson, 1973); subjects tend
to organize recall in a manner consistent with the organization of input,
i.e., by name or by attribute, (Perlmutter & Royer, 1973). Serial position
effects have been found with prose passages (Deese & Kaufman, 1957; Frase,
1969; Kirscher, 1971) while others (Richardson & Voss, 1960) have failed
o find the effect. Meyer and McConkie (1973) claim to have resolved the
apparent inconsistency. They separated serial position from structural
importance, using their representational system (to be described later),
and found recall is better predicted by the latter. I suspect, however,
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that if one can control structural importance, one would still find an
effect of serial position since it is such a robust finding with other
materials.
The research on prose which extends the work typically associated
with word pairs and sentences argues against the criticism that investi-
gations with smaller units of analysis will not generalize to normal text.
However, the conclusions one should draw from the results are not clear-cut.
Interference, positive transfer and organizational effects are only achieved
with paragraphs when much care is taken in construction of the paragraphs
so that they resemble each other in specific respects. Myrow and Anderson
(1972) acknowledge that their obtained results demonstrating retroactive
inhibition between passages are unlikely to occur in the classroom because
typically one does not encounter sets of passages that match (and mis-match)
in such specific ways.
It would be worthwhile to continue investigating the degree to which
effects found in verbal learning generalize to prose processing, but only
within the framework of a theory of memory and comprehension. A basic
complaint can be lodged against much of the research discussed in that it
concerns the discovery of the conditions under which interference effects
generalize to prose processing, but not the explanation of why and how they
generalize. The research would seem more important if memory mechanisms
that produce RI and PI in both verbal learning and prose paradigms were
proposed. Whether or not one obtains serial position effects with prose
is less interesting than knowing why one should or should not obtain the
same effect as that obtained with word lists. Anderson and Bower (1973)
propose the only theory that deals with these issues.
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1.4 Discussion
A number of results can be distilled from the preceding studies. The
extent to which a passage is comprehended or retained is not solely a func-
tion of the text or the reader. Rather, a number of experimental manipula-
tions can interact with text and reader to affect performance. The type of
questions asked about the passage, whether background information is pre-
sented, how easily subjects can map referents onto familiar concepts all
affect performance. In some circumstances it doesn't matter whether the
questions are asked before or after reading the passage; in other cases
better performance (ability to answer questions) occurs when questions are
asked prior to reading; in still other situations, performance is best if
questions are asked after the passage has been read. When passages are
sufficiently vague, they can only be understood if a title or picture is
given that indicates the setting.
Generalizations concerning effects of context, priming questions,
interference or transfer (e.g., when will manipulations have the greatest
effect), are difficult to specify. Which manipulations are effective at
which times could be predicted by a model for prose comprehension. Appar-
ent inconsistencies in results could perhaps be understood within a theo-
retical framework.
One of the requirements for such a comprehension model is a good
representation of text. The research discussed thus far was not concerned
with developing one.
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2. REPRESENTATIONS OF TEXT STRUCTURE
Many theorists concerned with finding an adequate representation of a
prose passage maintain that doing so is a necessary prerequisite to other
research on prose comprehension. Meyer (1975) has argued that structural
variables can influence the learning and retention of items in a word list
and that structure probably also affects retention of prose passages. She
points out that one can ameliorate problems such as measuring the similarity
and differences among passages and scoring the recall protocol from a pass-
age by the use of a structural analysis of prose. Others (e.g., Crothers,
1972; Frederiksen, 1975a) have argued that theorists will be able to induce
the processes involved in text comprehension by comparing memory protocols
of a passage with a representation of it. Whether or not these theories
of representation are useful for all aspects of research on text under-
standing remains to be seen. For example, it is not obvious that investi-
gations concerned with the optimal position for a priming question to
facilitate the acquisition of specific facts hinge on a structural analysis
of the passage to be read. Whether structural variables affect priming
facilitation is an empirical question.
There have been a number of approaches to the problem of specifying the
representation of a text or a story. The first sub-section to follow con-
cerns specifying logical relations within a story or text; other repre-
sentations are concerned with all relations found in a text or a story.
The third sub-section describes theories that have rules for generating a
story. Each representational theory is concerned with either expository
text or stories, rarely both.
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2.1 Representations of Logical Relations
2.1.1 Dawes
The earliest work to be concerned with semantic representations of
prose was that of Dawes (1964, 1966). Dawes was interested in investigating
what cognitive distortions people tend to make, especially distortions of
relations asserted from the material read. He looked at set relations in
stories and tested the idea that a person's memory for set relations would
"simplify" over time, specifically that disjunctive relations would become
nested relations (see Figure 1). Inclusion, exclusion and identity are all
defined as nested, while overlapping sets are disjunctive. Going from
disjunctive to nested is overgeneralizing (from "some, but not all" to
either "all" or "no") and the process reduces the number of categories in
the environment by deleting that part of set x not nested in set y. He did
find distortions and a tendency to simplify, but contrary to Bartlett's
thesis, he failed to find increasing simplicity of recall at greater delays.
His results can be taken as evidence that the phenomenon occurs at input
or output and has nothing to do with forgetting.
Comprehension and Retention of Prose
23
Figure 1: Venn diagram of Dawes' "Circle Island" story.
NESTED relations
inclusion
all senators are ranchers
exclusion
no senators are farmers
identity
none in figure, but all ranchers are wealthy and
all wealthy people are ranchers
DISJUNCTIVE relations
overlapping sets
Some senators belong to pro-canal association
2.1.2 Crothers
Crothers' (1972) work is similar to Dawes' in that it too concentrates
on the logical relations in a passage. Crothers measured the extent to
which prose recall would be predicted by his representation of the passage.
His representation only uses logical relations and a semantic hierarchy
which classifies concepts under their superordinates (that need not have
been mentioned in the test), rather than a richer relational system. The
original organization provided by the author is lost. The semantic
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hierarchies are connected together by the logical relations IS, WHY (because
of), OR, AND, and IFF. An example subgraph for the phrase, "One coat was
black and the other was gray" is given below:
one
O-- R coat---
other-
black-
- OR color-
gray-
Crothers failed to obtain the prediction that concepts at a higher
level in the hierarchy (defined by the semantic memory network of Collins
& Quillian, 1969) were more likely to be recalled. Overall, his conceptual
representation did a poor job of accounting for recall of passages. His idea
of trying to represent the story as it would be in the reader's memory was a
good idea, but his view of the reader's memory seems too impoverished: He
implied that one's semantic memory only notes set inclusion inferences,
e.g., a dog is an animal and a cat is an animal. However, it seems other
types of relations and idiosyncratic information is brought to bear in under-
standing a story. Crothers' representation seems overly influenced by Dawes'
analyses of set relations in stories and Collins and Quillian's theory of
the organization of memory. Crothers may have found it easy to represent his
passages using his representation, thereby lending initial credibility to
his notions. His passages however, were extremely descriptive (e.g.,
describing two kinds of nebulae) and thus could easily be represented by set
relations. Most passages are not so descriptive in character and would have
made more apparent the deficiencies of his theory for representing text.
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2.1.3 Frederiksen
Frederiksen (1972) had a model similar to Crother's in that Frederiksen's
semantic structure graph used both set relations and subject transformations
(i.e., implication relations). An example structure is given in Figure 2.
Frederiksen performed an experiment using Dawes' Circle Island story and he
has analyzed it in a number of ways (Frederiksen, 1972, 1975a, 1975b). Sub-
jects read the story four times: two of the three groups recalled after
each reading, and the other group was given a surprise recall after the last
reading of the story. They all recalled once more a week later. The unin-
formed group and one of the two informed groups also had an orienting task
of a problem solving nature, related to the passage, to work on after each
reading. The dependent measure was recall, and Frederiksen developed a
scoring system that noted whether concepts were overspecified (pseudo-
discriminated), e.g., colonel for officer, or underspecified (overgeneral-
ized) e.g., military man for officer. He looked at how orienting tasks
affected the specification of concepts and set relations and how this recall
changed as a function of successive recalls.
The group given a surprise test recalled less than the informed groups.
This group and the other problem solving group produced more elaborations
(statements not derivable "inferentially" from the passage), overgeneraliza-
tions and inferred relations than the group just asked to recall. Both
informed recall groups gave more "veridical" output than the uninformed
group, and the two informed groups did not differ in the amount of veridical
recall. The non-problem solving group gave more pseudo-discriminations.
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Frederiksen believed that the problem solvers had a greater processing load
and would therefore have to encode the input more simply. He argued that
the inferences produced in recall are products of simpler coding of the
input. With these two assumptions he explained the greater amount of
inferential recall of the problem solvers. However, this argument seems
wrong for several reasons: First, drawing inferences from the input should
require more processing, not less. Second, the amount of veridical recall
did not negatively correlate with inferential or derived recall. Therefore,
inferences could not result from a "greater processing load" in the problem
solving condition. Perhaps instead, "semantically relevant" memory errors
occur more frequently for subjects given a meaningful orienting task to
direct their prose processing because meaningful processing involves build-
ing a representation of the gist and ignoring the exact input phrases. A
greater processing load theory would imply, on the other hand, that these
subjects should lose more of the information irrelevant to the task. There
was no evidence of this. One explanation of why problem solvers produced
more elaborations not derivable from the story is that they import more
world knowledge in order to solve the problems. These imported facts needed
for solving problems may become confused with the input.
In analyzing the errors over successive recalls, Frederiksen (1975a,
1975b) found more inferred concepts and more overgeneralizations on each
output trial, but successive recalls lead to fewer elaborations. He con-
siders this evidence that generalizations occur during input (reading the
test) and elaborations are generated during recall. Presumably elaborations
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are edited during the input processing and generalizations are not, because
generalizations are not corrected on successive input trials. There is
another interpretation for this result, however. The more often one recalls,
the more boring the procedure becomes and hence, the more shorthand ex-
pressions one looks for. The group that only recalled once may have put
down more elaborations because they had little veridical recall and wanted
to say as much as possible. The groups who were then recalling for the
fourth time may have omitted the elaborations to get through the task as
quickly as possible. The inferences and overgeneralizations may have the
property of making the output shorter; any shortcut that expressed the same
idea would be desirable.
To test this alternative explanation, however, a control group would be
needed that Frederiksen did not provide: a group that read the story once,
but recalled four times. His theory would predict no additional inferences
after the first recall, but more elaborations on each successive output.
The other view predicts the opposite outcome.
One problem with Frederiksen's theoretical claims is that they are all
based on one study using one story, Circle Island. Dawes wrote Circle Island
to investigate errors of logical relations. Frederiksen's representation
for stories, like Crothers' will probably not fit most stories. To my
knowledge, this representation has not been tried out on a variety of passages.
2.2 Representations Concerned with More Complex Relations
2.2.1 Frederiksen
Frederiksen's (1975c) model has become more detailed and takes into
account far more aspects of language than his earlier representations,
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His representation involves two graphs, the semantic structure graph and the
logical structure graph. The first is reminiscent of Fillmore's (1968) case
grammar for sentences. He diagrams stative relations, case relations,
attributive relations, etc. into semantic hierarchies or networks, making
fine, semantic feature distinctions. The logical structure graph is not
hierarchical; propositions from the semantic structure graph are nodes
connected together by the logical, causal and algebraic relations. The
logical relations and causal relations include conjunction, disjunction,
logical implication, and material biconditional. The algebraic relations are
order (transitive) relations and proximity relations. He can also represent
relative time and location.
Frederiksen's representation is one of the few to include inferences.
That makes it a more realistic representation of what the long-term memory
structure might be like as a result of comprehending a passage. Unfortunate-
ly, his representations seem complex at the wrong "level" of understanding
of a passage. The strategy of decomposing concepts and relations into
semantic primitives does not seem viable as a representation for prose.
One could argue (see discussion of Kintsch, below) that people do not de-
compose words into their semantic primitives during comprehension. Even if
they do, a representation of an entire text should focus on the many higher
order, complex relations that express the message of the passage, not the
lower-level complexities. Frederiksen's system seems devised for represent-
ing the relations within a sentence, not among sentences. The network has
capacities for connecting propositions referentially and temporally, but
apart from these, there is little in his system that seems concerned with the
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text level as opposed to the sentence level. Textual aspects which he does
not represent include the overall organization of the text of the plot and
inferences and elaborations that connect lines of input.
2.2.2 Kintsch
Kintsch (1974) has also developed a formal representation for texts and
has performed numerous experiments to test the validity of this theory.
The fundamental unit in his analysis is the proposition. A text is repre-
sented as an ordered list of propositions. He avoids network representations
such as those described earlier, due to their impracticality for passages
of any length or complexity. Networks are messy for single propositions,
and they rapidly become unwieldy when expressing multiple propositions. A
sentence may consist of one or more simple propositions, each proposition
consisting in turn of a relation and a set of arguments. The representation
has the flavor of predicate calculus. Verbs and adjectives are relations
(attributes), and nouns and other propositions are its arguments. Proposi-
tions are connected together by means of a repetition rule, in which one
proposition is referred to by a "superordinate" proposition that contains
this subordinate as an argument. This forms a hierarchical structure.
Propositions are also connected by sharing the same arguments or concepts,
e.g., an individual of a story can be in multiple propositions. The first
proposition that uses the shared argument is considered the superordinate of
the proposition that contains the repeated argument. Propositions can also
be connected by an ampersand (&) when they share a common argument. For
example, Kintsch (1974, p. 63) represents "John broke his leg yesterday"
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as: ((BREAK, JOHN, LEG) = a) & (TIME, a, YESTERDAY). Kintsch claims his
hierarchical organization of text has predictive value for recall.
Kintsch does not include any inferences in his examples of text repre-
sentations, yet his theory does include rules for generating some inferences.
It is not clear from his rules what inferences could or could not be gener-
ated, nor which inferences are likely to be stored as part of comprehension.
Kintsch reports numerous experiments in support of his theory (e.g.,
Kintsch & Keenan, 1973; Kintsch, McKoon & Keenan, 1974; Kintsch & Monk,
1972). He admits that these experiments support a class of representations,
of which his is one; some studies, though, (e.g., Kintsch, 1974, ch. 7) were
designed to distinguish between his propositional representation and other
extant proposition representations. Below a few of his studies will be
described in varying detail.
In order to determine whether subjects draw and store inferences while
reading, Kintsch, McKoon, and Keenan (Kintsch, 1974, ch. 8) looked at reading
times for paragraphs that either stated or implied facts that followed from
the text and looked at time to judge if these facts were true of the text.
The "level" of difficulty of the inference was manipulated in one study; the
delay from study at which the question was asked was varied in a series of
experiments. Table 1 gives the example used in Kintsch's book for the differ-
ent levels of inference. Kintsch et al. in one condition actually presented
the inference as part of the text (explicit condition); in another condition
the statement was not presented, but could be readily inferred (implicit
condition). They found no difference in reading times that depended on
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Table I
Level I
A strong hand was needed to restrain the dog. The animal's
instincts had been aroused by the sight of the fleeting deer.
(The dog was an animal.)
Level 2
A burning cigarette was carelessly discarded. The fire
destroyed many acres of virgin forest.
(A discarded cigarette started a fire.)
Level 3
Police are hunting a man in hiding. The wife of Bob Birch
disclosed illegal business practices in an interview on
Saturday.
(Bob Birch is the man who is hiding.)
whether the statement was explicit or implicit, and no systematic effect on
reading time due to level of inference. Time to verify a fact did not depend
on level of inference either. Subjects were faster to verify statements that
were explicit in the text immediately and a half minute later, but the differ-
ence in reaction time to verify explicit versus implicit statements was not
significant 20 minutes or 48 hours later. They concluded that there is an
immediate surface structure advantage for the presented condition, but over
time this superficial difference in memory representations evaporates, i.e.,
subjects have stored the inference in the implicit condition and the under-
lying representations in memory are the same. One might question this
interpretation, however, since the appropriate statistical test was not
5
conducted.
Kintsch and Monk (1972; Kintsch, 1974, ch. 5) argued that ideas in a
text are represented in propositional format which does not depend on the
surface structure complexity of the input. Two versions of a passage were
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constructed, one simple in structure and one complex, although both were
presumed to convey the same ideas. Subjects read one of the two versions.
Reading time was of interest as was time to judge that an inference from
the story was valid. They found that reading times were longer for complex
passages, but that latencies to judge inferences did not vary as a function
of complexity. These findings are consistent with their notion that it
takes longer to comprehend complex statements and encode them into a proposi-
tional format; once stored in their canonical representation, however, the
time to make the inference should not reflect surface structure. Kintsch
also suggests that recall can be predicted by level in the hierarchy, super-
ordinate propositions being recalled more frequently. Kintsch and Keenan
(1973) found this trend. McKoon (1977) found subjects are faster and more
accurate to verify topic information than details and that the discrepancy
between topic and details grows with delay.
A number of theorists (e.g., Rumelhart, Lindsay & Norman, 1972; Schank,
1973) and Kintsch at one time (Kintsch, 1972) have claimed that words are
decomposed into their semantic primitives during comprehension. Kintsch
(1974, ch. 11) reports a series of experiments testing the validity of this
notion. Using the derivations of generative semanticists (e.g., Lakoff,
1970), Kintsch determined which words are more complex, i.e., have the
longest derivation to unpack. These words, if decomposed when parsed, should
be more difficult to process. Examples of complex words are kindness,
prosecutor, accuse and persuade; simple words include environment, orchestra,
relate and save. The word "persuaden should decompose to "cause y to intend
to do x." In one experiment, Kintsch had subjects complete sentences (make
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a sentence out of a phrase) while varying the complexity of a word in the
presented phrase. Length, imagery, and frequency were controlled. Latency
to initiate writing in a sentence completion task was not a function of
complexity. Phoneme monitoring tasks did not reflect this factor either.
Failing to obtain a difference in sentence processing, Kintsch looked at
recall of sentences with words of differing complexity, but found no effect
here either. He concluded from this series of studies that one does not
typically decompose words during comprehension. He notes, too, that it is
unlikely that we would have developed single words to express complex ideas
if the words had to be "unpacked" each time they were heard.
In some respects, Kintsch's (1974) theory is rather similar to
Frederiksen's latest (1975c) theory. Fredriksen gives more emphasis to a
low-level (sentence) representation while Kintsch's hierarchical structure
seems somewhat better suited to text organization. Certainly a linear
notation is more tractable for text representation than is a network
structure, although formally, there is no difference. Both theorists in-
clude mechanisms for cross-proposition inferences. However, they both seem
more concerned with representing sentences within a passage than the ideas
of the passage itself, i.e., the inferences in both systems seem to be
narrow in scope. They are not as low-level as those of Dawes, Crothers and
the earlier work of Frederiksen, but the inferences tend to focus on such
problems as causation and reference. Table 1 illustrates the levels of
inference used in Kintsch's experiment. They give an idea of the range of
inferences he considers.
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The inferences one would like to see in their representations or models
for comprehension are those derived from knowledge about the passage as a
whole, e.g., inferences about characters' motivation, goals, and responses
to events. Elaborations about spatial locations, instantiation of physical
details of people and objects are probably made during comprehension, too.
Perhaps Kintsch and Frederiksen consider the elaborations suggested above
to be idiosyncratic, and therefore, impossible to represent. Kintsch does
state that some inferences are made during comprehension, and in a chapter
(Kintsch, 1974, ch. 4) in which he offers a theoretical explanation for
Encoding Specificity (Tulving & Thomson, 1973), he postulates the use of
elaborations to modify the memory structure of "episodic events" (Tulving,
1972). Unfortunately, his notion of elaborations here seems restricted to
phonemic information, superset and property information.
2.2.3 Meyer
Meyer (1975), like Kintsch, has a hierarchical rather than a network
representation. Her theory adapted from Grimes (1975) has a greater resem-
blance to Fillmore's (1968) grammar than do other theories. The similarity
between her model and Fillmore's is in the emphasis of the role or case
terms to represent the relation between the verb (predicate) and the other
words (arguments) in the sentence. (Use of Fillmore's case grammar has also
been adopted to a lesser extent by Rumelhart, Lindsay & Norman, 1972;
Kintsch, 1972, 1974; and Frederiksen, 1972, 1975c). Meyer lists nine cases
or roles quite similar to Fillmore's, which she calls "lexical predicates".
Unlike Fillmore (but very much like Grimes), she has "rhetorical predicates"
at a level above the lexical predicates. These higher level predicates give
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prose its organization. Neither Frederiksen's nor Kintsch's representations
(discussed above) have such a well-developed, higher-level organization.
The representation Meyer uses resembles an outline of a passage. Prop-
ositions are indented according to their importance. Unlike an outline,
however, every idea is included and relationships are indicated between
branches at the same level and at differing levels. These relations are
the rhetorical predicates, and they fall into three categories: (a) paratac-
tic relations, which have at least two arguments of equal weight (e.g.,
RESPONSE: problems and solution); (b) hypotactic relations in which the
arguments are unequal (e.g., SPECIFIC: problem and the details of the
problem); and (c) neutral relations in which a collection of arguments can
have equal weight or not (e.g., ATTRIBUTION).
Meyer has attempted to validate her representation empirically with a
recall experiment. The experiment was designed to show that the probability
of recall of a sentence was a function of its "height" in the content
structure (i.e., its importance indicated by degree of indentation), Meyer
constructed two passages with the identical target paragraph embedded in
each. The paragraph was placed high in content structure in one passage
and low in the other, but its serial position was the same. She found that
the two passages as a whole were recalled equally well but that the recall
of the target paragraph differed as a function of "height." The differences
in recall between the two paragraphs increased with a week's delay.
After the free recall task at a week's delay, subjects were given a cued
recall test. Cued recall in her experiment meant giving subjects all the
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content words from the passage in any unsystematic (scrambled) order and
asking them to arrange the words in the correct order. Even in this task,
the advantage of the paragraph high in the content structure was maintained
over the paragraph low in the content structure. From these results, Meyer
concluded that the difference in memory representation for "low" and "high"
paragraphs can not just be a function of differential accessibility. She
argues that if the paragraphs were stored equally well, any differences
due to accessibility would be avoided by the cued recall methodology.
Meyer's task, however, seems sufficiently different from the standard cued
recall task that differential accessibility still seems a possible explana-
tion. People have great difficulty solving anagrams, yet few would doubt
that these puzzle solvers have the word (whose letters are presented in
scrambled order) stored in memory. It may well be in her task that subjects
tried to retrieve aspects of the story and then looked for the words to put
in the appropriate slots of the retrieved aspects.
Meyer found that the frequency of recall of an idea unit high in the
paragraph structure was determined by the unit's functional relationships
to other units, rather than its content per se. This was not true, however,
for idea units that were low in the content structure. In other words, two
different passages with the same structure of specific relations, but with
different content, would yield a high positive correlation of probability of
an item's recall from the same point in the structure, so long as that point
is a "high" point; items from the same point low in the structure are not
correlated with respect to recall. In these cases, the words recalled are
quite idiosyncratic to story and subject.
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From this result and ones mentioned earlier, Meyer concluded that ele-
ments "high" in the passage are given more processing time than elements
lower in the passage. Perhaps all higher-level material is attended to, and
with the remaining "processing-time" the subject attends to that low-level
information which "catches his eye" (i.e., those units that seem inherent-
ly interesting). This would explain why, at low levels, structure does not
predict recall. The mechanism Meyer suggests to explain differential re-
tention is additional rehearsal. It has been shown, though, (Bjork &
Jongeward, 1973) that additional rehearsal, per se, does not improve recall.
One possible process might involve generating inferences and elaborations
which draw upon previous knowledge of related information; the information
higher in the structure would be elaborated more often than low-level
information.
There is an explanation for her differences in recall which does not
posit differential processing at input. Low-level information may have been
stored equally well, but not recalled as well due to output interference
(Roediger, 1973, 1974). The phenomenon of output interference is that, other
things equal, the earlier something is tested, the better it is recalled;
recalling some things has a damaging effect on recalling other things (see
Crowder, 1976, for a discussion). In other words, the subject would recall
aspects of the story high in the content structure first because they are
more important or essential. Things that are low in priority are interfered
with because of this bias in order of recall.
Meyer's representations do not include any inferences or elaborations,
not even ones necessary to connect various propositions of different sentences.
Comprehension and Retention of Prose
39
Clearly it is not her goal to represent the structure of prose in the
reader's head; if that were her goal, she would not include every detail
from the passage and she would include many inferences and details people
integrate into prose when they read it. Since this is not the intent of
her representation, one might ask what her structure is to represent. The
fact that the structure looks like an outline strongly suggests that she
represents what the author wanted to say, not what the reader absorbs. Her
representation can be used to predict recall and as a metric to compare
passages. While these aspects are useful, representing the author's in-
tended message is less interesting to psychologists than is representing
the reader's comprehension of it. Meyer's representation might have been
more interesting if she had indicated how the author's intended meaning is
transformed into prose and then what portion of the original meaning is
represented in the "comprehender's" long-term memory. This might have
predicted recall still better.
There are a few other criticisms that can be made: For propositions
represented "high" in her hierarchy, Meyer obtains systematic recall effects
such that propositions with one structural relation are recalled better than
propositions with other relations at the same level. Although at high
levels, she found recall highly correlated with type of relation, she offers
no explanation for why one relation should be better recalled than another.
Meyer has only tried to apply her representation to passages that consist
largely of factual statements, much like Crothers'. The representation does
not seem suitable to a story which involves a plot with motivations, charac-
ter reactions to events, etc.
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Meyer's thesis has been a major contribution to the study of prose pro-
cessing and retention. She has developed the first representation that
actually seems concerned with passage level information rather than sentence
level material. Her representation has been empirically validated and will
be a useful tool in the design of future recall experiments using prose.
For example, it is possible that various manipulations, such as priming
questions, which affect a subject's ability to answer questions, will inter-
act with the information's "height" in the passage representation. Pre-
sumably an important point will be less affected by a focusing manipulation
than would a detail. Another use of Meyer's representation is to insure that
two passages are equally complex. This would be important if one wishes to
use a within-subject design in which subjects were to process the two pass-
ages differently.
2.3 Formal Models of Text Structure
There have been a number of attempts to identify the general organiza-
tional structures in prose (e.g., Colby, 1973; Lakoff, 1972; Mandler &
Johnson, 1977; Propp, 1958; Rumelhart, 1975; Thorndyke, 1977; van Dijk, 1977).
Developing a grammar for discourse has some of the same attractions that work
on a grammar for sentences has, viz., the task is well defined, and it is
therefore quite easy to determine when passages fail to fit the grammar.
Although Meyer has been concerned with text structure, it is not clear
that her work belongs in this group because her theory is less formal:
She does not have a grammar to generate a passage nor formal procedures for
selecting which propositions fit under which rhetorical predicates.
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2.3.1 Theory of Discourse and Macro-structures
Van Dijk (1975, 1977; Kintsch & van Dijk, 1975; van Dijk & Kintsch,
1976) has been concerned with a general theory of discourse. Van Dijk has
incorporated Kintsch's work discussed above (Kintsch, 1974) into his theory
of semantic representations for sentences and sequences of sentences. This
representation is called the micro-structure of the passage. Van Dijk has
also developed a theory of semantic representation for global discourse
structures. The global structures are called the macro-structures of the
passage. Macro-rules allow one to relate the micro-structures to the macro-
structures. Macro-structures are the main aspects of a text that are stored
during comprehension.
In van Dijk and Kintsch's theory, discourse can be expressed in terms
of super structures which are even higher level than macro-structures. They
have limited their work to the narrative structure, one type of superstruc-
ture. A narrative structure is not itself linguistic, i.e., the structure
can be expressed through pictures, etc. When it is expressed linguisti-
cally, it is called a story. A simplified narrative grammar is given in
Table 2. Narrative rules do not seem as useful as macro-structures in that
not all linguistic passages fit the grammar (e.g., text books, diaries,
journal articles will not fit the rules). Because of this lack of generality,
van Dijk has chosen not to devote much attention to this generative grammar
for stories and rather concentrates on macro-structure.
One reason van Dijk devised macro-rules and investigated macro-structures
may have been due to his experimental results: He asked subjects to read a
story and later recall it. Other subjects were asked to read and summarize
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the same passages. He found a great deal of consistency in the recalls and
in the summaries. The common propositions found in all subjects' recall
formed a sort of story itself and it was quite close to the summaries from
the other subjects. These consistently recalled propositions are considered
to comprise the macro-structure. Propositions most likely to be recalled
either introduce main characters, give the characters' goals, or describe
the actions leading to these goals and results from the attempt. Proposi-
tions concerned with settings, mental actions, etc. tend to be ignored.
Table 2
NARRATIVE
ACCOUNT
EPISODE
HAPPENING
ACCOUNT + MORAL
SETTING + EPISODE
HAPPENING + EVALUATION
COMPLICATION + RESOLUTION
In van Dijk's analysis, the micro-structure usually entails the macro-
structure. He derives three macro-rules: generalization, deletion and con-
struction. These are posited to transform a text base into the core or
essential macro-text base. The rule of generalization allows one to summar-
ize a sequence of statements. There exist different levels of generality of
abstraction entailed by the level of explicit text. The level of abstraction
that is taken is the least general which also defines the smallest superset.
The abstraction process stops when a superclass would not shorten the number
of propositions. For example, statements in a text such as "Peter has a dog,
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and three cats. He has a parakeet, etc." would be reduced to "Peter has
pets," not "Peter has animals" or "Peter has things." A double application
of the generalization rule can occur in a case where both the subjects and
predicates of sentences are generalized: "Mommy was baking cakes, Daddy was
gardening while their son washed the car and their daughter sewed a dress,"
can be summarized as "The family was working on household chores." Infer-
ences of this type can be said to be true by definition.
Inferences using the rule of construction, on the other hand, are prob-
ably true but not necessarily true. Construction refers to finding a summary
term for a set of actions. With this rule, the summary term is not entailed
by the actions, but if all the required actions are stated, one infers the
event. For example, "Peter laid foundations, built walls, built a roof..."
becomes "Peter built a house." Whether one infers a particular summary
depends upon the independent likelihood of that interpretation. If one
reads that John went to the train station, a summary might be that he is
going to take a trip, although this interpretation does not have to be true.
The other important macro-rule, the rule of deletion does not involve
inferences. It follows the principle of irrelevancy, i.e., delete proposi-
tions that have no consequence, that are merely details. For example, one
may delete from "Mary hit a blue ball that broke a window," the detail that
the ball was blue. Other types of deletions include omitting extra speci-
fication of an act. The phrases "John went to London yesterday. He went to
the airport, purchased a ticket and got on a plane bound for London..." are
rewritten as "John went to London yesterday." One often deletes precondi-
tions, normal conditions and some normal consequences, so that "John went to
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the bank to cash a check" might be sufficient to assume that the bank was
open and that he received money and not worry how he got there.
Van Dijk and Kintsch have continued to explore the usefulness of the
notion of macro-structures (van Dijk & Kintsch, 1976; Kintsch & van Dijk,
1975). They are not interested in the role of inferences, per se, but wish
to demonstrate the importance of macro-structures to comprehension. However,
their results also demonstrate how the reader uses his conceptual structures
and world knowledge to infer what must be the appropriate organization of
the text. Subjects read passages with the intra-paragraph organization
intact, but the inter-paragraph organization scrambled for half of the
readers. They felt that this essentially scrambled macro-structures without
disturbing micro-structures. Although subjects took much longer to read
stories with distorted macro-structures, the time to generate summaries
was not significantly longer for the scrambled group. The summaries made
by subjects who read scrambled passages could not be distinguished (by
other subjects) from summaries of subjects who read normal passages. These
results are consistent with the notion that subjects work harder to assemble
or infer the macro-structure when the paragraphs have been scrambled (hence,
the longer reading time), but that once this is done, the representation
will be the same as that for an unscrambled passage. This study resembles
that of Kintsch and Monk described earlier.
In a related experiment with children, Kintsch has found a great deal
more consistency in recall of the important (macro-structure) propositions
of a story when the story was presented with the macro-structure intact.
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Both this study and the one just described above, were taken as evidence
of the existence of macro-structures. Although the notion of macro-
structures is a useful one and the experiments are suggestive, one should
ask how many of the possible set of outcomes from their experiments would
be considered as consistent with the notion of "macro-structures." Note
that in the case of the children's data, a failure to make use of the
scrambled order was considered as evidence for the existence of macro-
structures in children; for adults, the ability to overcome the scrambled
order and produce a summary indistinguishable from those of normal passages
is considered as evidence for macro-structures, too.
Greeno and Noreen (1974) demonstrated the importance of structure to
comprehension in a study similar to those of van Dijk and Kintsch. They
measured the time to read each sentence of a story and varied the ease with
which the organization of the passage containing the sentences could be
inferred. They gave subjects one of two presentation sequences. In
either case, the information could be represented as a set of linked
hierarchies. In the difficult condition, the information was presented
to the subject in bottom-up order; in the other condition, the subject
read the sentences top:-down. It took subjects only two-thirds as long to
read low-level sentences in the hierarchy if they were preceded by sentences
above them in the hierarchy. There was not a comparable savings for high-
level sentences preceded by low-level ones. Greeno and Nbreen suggest
that this result occurred because relationships involved in low-level
sentences are consistent with the more general ones given in the higher-
level statements. Subjects can process these lower-level sentences faster
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because part of the conceptual structure has already been built. When
the order is reversed, the procedure is less efficient. As would be
expected by these notions, a sentence inconsistent with the structure took
longer to process only when it was read after high-level statements.
When the same sentence was read before the structure was obvious, the sub-
sequent sentences took longer as they seemed inconsistent. These results
seem consistent with Ausubel's notion of advance organizers.
2.4 Story Grammars
2.4.1 Rumelhart
Rumelhart's (1975) generative grammar for stories and set of summariza-
tion rules was one of the first text grammars to be developed and tested and
has influenced the work of other psychologists (e.g., Mandler & Johnson,
1977; Stein & Glenn, in press; Thorndyke, 1977). In his chapter in Bobrow and
Collins (1975) Rumelhart listed two sets of rewrite rules, one called
syntactic rules, the other semantic interpretation rules. These are listed
in Table 3. The semantic rules are listed using a double arrow. The
important differences between the two sets of rules is not obvious. Syntac-
tic rules specify how a sentence is decomposed; the semantic rules are
intended to specify the relations among the parts.
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Table 3
Rumelhart's Syntactic Rules and [Semantic Interpretation Rules]
(1) Store -> Setting + Episode
> [ALLOW (Setting, Episode)]
(2) Setting -> (States)*
=> [AND (State, state,.....)]
(3) Episode -> Event + Reaction
=> [INITIATE (Event, Reaction)]
(4) Event ->{Episodel Change-of-state Action Event + Event}
=>[CAUSE (Eventl, Event 2 ) or ALLOW (Eventl, Event 2 )]
(5) Reaction -> Internal Response + Overt Response
=> [MOTIVATE (Interval-response, Overt Response)]
(6) Internal Response ->{Emotion I Desire}
(7) Overt Response ->{Action I (Attempt)*}
=>[THEN (Attempt l , Attempt2, . . . .. )
(8) Attempt -> Plan + Application
=>[MOTIVATE (Plan, Application)]
(9) Application -> (Preaction)* + Action + Consequence
- [ALLOW (AND (Preaction, Preaction,.....),
{CAUSE I INITIATEI ALLOW} (Action, Consequence))]
(10) Preaction -> Subgoal + (Attempt)*
> [MOTIVATE [Subgoal, THEN (Attempt,....)] ]
(11) Consequence -> {Reaction Event}
Essentially a story is thought to consist of an episode in a particular
setting. An episode consists of an event plus a reaction, where an event
might consist of a change of state or an action, etc. Rumelhart gave
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several examples of stories and fables that seem to fit his grammar. He
does not claim that the grammar will fit all stories, especially "more
complex multi-protagonist stories." However, he states that it will account
for a wide range of simple stories.
Rumelhart's grammar can be applied to simple stories with only limited
success. For example, the first rule allows a story to be rewritten into a
setting plus an episode. The grammar allows for more than one episode
because events can be rewritten into an episode; however, a story is allowed
only one setting. Many simple stories have, in fact, different settings for
different episodes. More importantly, the tree structure that is generated
from the grammar fails to capture the relative importance of various epi-
sodes. That is, a second episode must be subordinate to the first. In some
stories, however, a second episode can seem at least as important as the
first even if the first episode caused the second. Therefore, this second
episode should be represented at as high a level in the tree structure.
The representation Rumelhart offers fails to capture critical inferences
or interpretations that readers derive from a story. For example, in one
fable that he represents (Rumelhart, 1977), a dog loses his meat through
greed. The dog saw his reflection in the water and, thinking it was a
different dog with meat, he snapped at the second piece of meat, only to
lose his own. The reader comprehends the passage by noting something like
"greed is counter-productive" or "be satisfied with what you have."
Rumelhart's schema does not account for this derived, higher-level notion.
In addition to developing a generative grammar for stories, Rumelhart
has been concerned with specifying rules for summarization of stories.
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His 1975 paper gives a formal set of summarization rules. When the story
is represented appropriately in a tree structure, a summary of the story
would include the top nodes of the tree, omitting the lower branches which
contain details. A summary of an episode involving the protagonist, P,
would include a summary of how P tried to get the goal and a summary of the
resulting outcome. If the attempt was successful, the summary might be "P
got the goal, G, by a certain method, M."
Recall data and summarization protocols have been examined for sets of
stories that fit Rumelhart's grammar. Information high in his tree structures
should be recalled more often than information (details) in the lower
branches. Rumelhart considers the data of Thorndyke (1977) and Meyer (1975)
as support for this basic idea. He has also collected data of his own,
looking at subjects' recall to stories after the subjects have summarized
the stories. He found that recall was highly correlated with level in the
representation hierarchy; a proposition was predicted to be recalled if a
proposition lower in the hierarchy was recalled. The conditional probability
of a proposition being recalled given that it was predicted to be recalled
was about 95%, and the conditional probability of a proposition being pre-
dicted given that it was recalled was about 88%. These results seem similar
to Meyer's: Information high in his tree structure was recalled as was
information high in her content structure; information that is lower in
structural importance, and therefore not predicted to be recalled by
Rumelhart, was output 12% of the time. Meyer also found some recall of low-
level material.
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Although Rumelhart has accounted for much of the variance in subjects'
recall using his grammar, one must still be cautious in making conclusions
on the basis of its predictive power. All the stories he used in his exper-
iment he designed (or selected) to fit the grammar. It is easy to find
stories that will not fit the grammar.
2.4.2 Thorndyke
Thorndyke's grammar is adapted from Rumelhart's and bears a great deal
of resemblance to it, except he emphasizes the goal structure more than
Rumelhart. The main character is seen as trying to solve a problem or obtain
a goal. Thorndyke demonstrated the importance of goal structure by re-
writing stories that initially fit the grammar to violate various aspects of
it. Recall was best in the untouched version of a story for which the goal
structure was clearest. It was somewhat worse if the theme or goal was
transposed to the end with all the subgoals removed; it was worse yet with
no theme; the version that changed the story to consist only of stative and
single action sentences had the poorest performance.
Thorndyke showed that recall of a second story was facilitated by first
reading and recalling a story with the same structural representation. Rep-
etition of characters in two stories with different representations (of plot)
was detrimental. This result is similar to the one reported by Bower (1974),
mentioned earlier. The facilitation could have arisen from savings in time
needed to process structure, as Thorndyke suggests. This would allow more
time to process the content of the story and presumably improve memory for it.
On the other hand, the improvement in recall may have been due to better
learned retrieval cues. That is, the second recall would be aided by a better
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also possible that both factors were operating. Thorndyke also concluded
that content affected recall independently of structural organization.
Imagery ratings were correlated with recall of a passage even when factors
of structural complexity were partialed out.
2.4.3 Mandler and Johnson
Mandler and Johnson (1977) have adapted Rumelhart's grammar and have
constructed a story grammar (or "schema" as they call it) that allows more
recursion of episodes and is somewhat more complex. They have deleted
Rumelhart's semantic structure rules and added a moral at the topic level
of the tree structure, similar to van Dijk's analysis.
Mandler and Johnson's approach seems more promising than previous ones
in part because of the greater flexibility and recursive capacity of their
grammar, the rules for which are given in Table 4. Flexibility is needed
in grammars even for "simple" stories, since the class of simple stories
has a great deal of variability in structure.
Mandler and Johnson view the story schema as a collection of expecta-
tions that are modified as new semantic and syntactic information is
processed. The schema is thought to facilitate encoding and retrieval.
Because their model attempts to utilize general knowledge as well as
knowledge of story grammars, it may be more successful in identifying the
constituents of a story. Thorndyke seems to focus on plot structure almost
to the exclusion of story content, while Mandler and Johnson analyze which
aspects of an episode are most important to the reader. Their predictions
concerning recall take content into account.
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Table 4
Summary of Rewrite Rules for Mandler & Johnson's Story Grammar
(1) Fable -- > Story AND Moral
(2) Story -- > Setting AND Event Structure
(3) Setting -- > State* (AND Event*)
Event'*
(4) State* -> State ((AND State)n)
AND
(5) Event* -> Event (( THEN Event) n)((AND State)n)
CAUSE
(6) Event Structure -- > Episode ((THEN Episode)n)
(7) Episode -- > Beginning CAUSE Development CAUSE Ending
(8) Beginning -- > Event*
Episode
(9) Development -- > Simple Reaction CAUSE Action
Complex Reaction CAUSE Goal Path
(10) Simple Reaction - > Internal Event ((CAUSE Internal Event)n)
(11) Action -- > Event
(12) Complex Reaction -- > Simple Reaction CAUSE Goal
(13) Goal -> Internal State
(14) Goal Path -- > Attempt CAUSE Outcome
Goal Path (CAUSE Goal Path)n
(15) Attempt -- > Event*
(16) Outcome -- > Event*
Episode
(17) Event* (AND Emphasis)
Ending -- > Emphasis
Episode
(18) Emphasis -- > State
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The experimental predictions of Mandler and Johnson go beyond the
traditional ones that are concerned with level in the hierarchical represen-
tation. For example, they postulate that causally connected episodes will
be better recalled than temporally connected episodes. Recall of sentences
in the correct order of presentation depends upon the degree of structure
present in the passage, such that stories which have a higher degree of
structure will be recalled in more accurate temporal order than less
structured stories. Elaborations will be poorly recalled. Omissions and
violations of the ideal structure will result in additions and distortions
in a subject's recall. Their model includes several deletion transforma-
tions. The structure of the famous passage "The War of the Ghosts" used by
Bartlett (1932) is an example of a structure that is far from ideal.
Mandler and Johnson predicted which aspects of this passage would be for-
gotten and how modifications of the passage will affect recall. Their pre-
dictions concerning the types of information that will be retained was
supported by a developmental study. The same trends were observed at all
ages, although there were some qualitative differences, e.g., young children
almost never recall reactions to events.
2.4.4 Stein and Glenn
Stein and Glenn's approach bears a great resemblance to that of
Mandler and Johnson. It shares many of its virtues. Both grammars contain
rules that define the units in a story and the relations among the units.
Unlike Rumelhart or Thorndyke, they allow actions as well as states in their
settings. One critical difference noted by Black (1978) is that the Stein
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and Glenn grammar does not allow lower level units to be re-written into
higher level units, while the others do. Like Mandler and Johnson, they have
validated their grammars with developmental data as well as adult data. Both
groups have shown that organization of information in the subject's recall
of a story does not change with age. It is unfortunate that neither group
discussed the similarities and differences of their approaches.
An example of the converging experiments Stein and Glenn have conducted
to support their grammar are a series recently published by Glenn (1978).
In some studies, she would vary the length of stories, keeping structure
constant; in others, she would vary the structure of episodes. Amount re-
called and number of elaborations generated was affected by length, but
recall organization was not. Output protocols were scored according to
which aspect of an episode was recalled more often than another. A consis-
tent pattern emerged such that certain informational categories (e.g., inter-
nal response of protagonist vs. reaction of protagonist to a consequence)
were recalled more frequently than others. This result was taken as evidence
for the validity of the grammar which defined these categories. Mandler and
Johnson also analyze the pattern of recall on the basis of type of proposi-
tion, while Thorndyke notes only level in the hierarchy.
Stein and Glenn claim that their grammar is "inherently" a theory of
processing (e.g., Glenn, 1978). Glenn has gone on to argue that because the
pattern of recall for a story is consistent with the story grammar's repre-
sentation of it, "the story grammar, as a model of processing," is supported.
Neither assertion is true. No grammar can implicitly contain a process model.
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A story grammar only offers rules for generating acceptable stories, pro-
vided that one knows what the components in the grammar refer to.
A processing model is necessary to predict behavior using a grammar.
However the need for a model does not imply that one exists "inherently."
The fact that percent recall varies significantly and consistently according
to constituents identified by the grammar is support for the grammar as a
descriptive tool. It is not evidence for it as a processing model. A
processing model would specify how input is parsed and how the reader
determines which constituents are more important, how the information is
recalled, etc.
2.4.5 Discussion of Story Grammars
The work on story grammars focuses on syntactic structures common to
some simple stories. All of the theorists concerned with story grammars
and structural representations of text make cogent arguments concerning the
importance of such analyses. Mandler and Johnson state that their long
range goal is to be able to predict what people will and will not be able
to remember from connected discourse. It is also claimed that story
grammars are needed to explain prose comprehension. However, an adequate
process model has not been offered to explain how these grammars are in-
volved in comprehension. For example, if the grammars proposed are actually
used to help parse a passage, how does the reader know which of the many
grammars (fables, narratives, complex stories, texts, etc.) is appropriate
for a given input? Perhaps multiple grammars are tried in parallel to
determine the correct representation. How does the reader know when a passage
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is in violation of a given structure (i.e., unacceptable) as opposed to
being an exemplar of another grammar? These are certainly not insurmountable
problems, but they have not been touched by those arguing for the usefulness
of these grammars.
One might wish to argue that part of the usefulness of grammars is
to identify the constituents or basic units of comprehension within a story,
i.e., those elements that fall at a terminal node in a representation. This
would be useful because any process model must identify the constituents it
operates on. However, before the terminal propositions can be identified it
is necessary to perform a semantic analysis of them, e.g., decide if a term-
inal proposition can be a "cause." A parsing scheme that uses the meaning or
content of the passage to generate expectations about the next words from
the input seems more promising. Schank (1972) argued that syntactic parsers
were not adequate to account for humans' ability to comprehend sentences.
He argued that parsers should dwell on the meanings of the words, not the form
classes of the words. Similarly, comprehension models for passages should
dwell on the meaning of sentences and not the possible structural representa-
tion. Mandler and Johnson admit that thus far they have stressed syntactic
aspects of stories, largely ignoring the semantic content. They have
incorporated the "content" of a passage into their theory more than most
others, but they need to do much more.
The representation of a story in the comprehender's mind must result
from some process operating upon the input. Some of the representations
discussed thus far (e.g., Meyer) are intended to reflect the input as the
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author intended to convey the message. Other grammars discussed are intended
to be predictive of the representation of the input in the comprehender's
memory. Exactly how the grammar is represented in the comprehender's
memory is not clear, nor is it clear how the grammar is used in building a
representation.
The next section will focus on process oriented models, on approaches
that emphasize world knowledge and on approaches concerned with the inferences
made during comprehension. The criterion used to decide which work is included
in the present section and which in the following section is not as clear as
it should be. For example, some of the research just described seems as
concerned with issues of prior knowledge as some of the work to be discussed.
Nevertheless, in order to bring attention to the diversity of approaches to
the problem of prose processing, a division had to be drawn somewhere.
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3. USE OF WORLD KNOWLEDGE TO AID COMPREHENSION
3.1 Schemata, Frames and Prototypes
The introduction of the term "schema" to replace the term "grammar"
is not unique to Mandler and Johnson. Rumelhart (1976) and Rumelhart and
Ortony (1977) have more recently viewed Rumelhart's general plot structure
or story grammar as just one grammar or "schema" among many that people
have available for everyday functioning. Rumelhart and Ortony discuss
schemata in terms that go beyond story comprehension. They define a schema
as an abstract representation of a generalized concept or situation. There
are schemata for pattern perception (e.g., a face schema), for motor skills
(e.g., a juggling schema) as well as for comprehension (e.g., a "give"
schema). These schemata operate at all levels. A higher level schema will
call a subschema to analyze part of the passage. A representation involving
schemata would merely have pointers to subschemata. For example, the
"stroll" schema would merely point to the "walk" schema. This is a departure
from Rumelhart's earlier views in which, for example, all verbs were "un-
packed" for comprehension (Rumelhart & Levin, 1975).
Schemata for stories are like grammars in that they allow one to decide
what is and what is not a story and what are the constituents of the story.
If a story does not fit any of the available schemata, it is not an
"acceptable" story. The schema Rumelhart describes is one in which some-
thing happens to the protagonist which sets up a goal. The rest of the
story is concerned with trying to achieve the goal. A passage is a story
fragment when a goal has been set up and the passage does not have a
resolution or an outcome.
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The idea of using schemata is actually an old one. Rumelhart and
Ortony, mention that Kant (1781) as well as Bartlett (1932) put forth
related views. More recently, Chafe (1976) and Winograd (1977) have also
adopted the term in trying to describe the mechanisms involved in prose
comprehension. According to these theorists, a schema or.prototype gives
the basic structure of a class of its instantiations. No instantiation
matches the prototype of schema perfectly. Chafe believes that when a
person stores information about an event in memory, the person encodes it
with respect to his prototype of similar events, but that the match is
not all or none. He argues that information is stored in a "schematic"
rather than a "propositional" form because a person does not report the same
experience in the same way on two separate occasions, each report being a
variation on the schema. This argument is less than convincing for two
reasons. First, it is not clear why a propositional representation is in-
compatible with novelty in expressing the same event; second, my own
impression is that the overlap in the retelling of events, jokes, etc. by
a given individual is often more striking than any novelty in his exposition.
In fact, such retellings often remind me of a prerecorded message being
played again.
Winograd (1977) has also adopted the term schemata but relates it to
Minsky's (1975) "frames." The distinction he offers between the two concepts
is quite subtle. Frames are definitions; they denote a representation with
variables or slots to be filled by a particular instance. Certain slots
are optional, i.e., they do not have to be given a value for a particular
instance. Others are mandatory and assume default values when not specified
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in the story. Schemata, on the other hand, are more flexible in that they
allow for partial fits in expressing ideas.
Like Rumelhart, Winograd believes that schemata represent concepts
which vary in their levels of abstraction; one schema can be embedded within
another. Both Winograd and Rumelhart mentioned briefly when presenting
papers at the 1976 Carnegie Symposium that schemata include procedural
information for recognizing whether something should be classified as an
instance of the schema. How this recognition process would work is not
yet clear.
While arguing for the virtues of schemata, Winograd also criticized
other approaches, viz., the use of scripts and plans by Schank and Abelson
(1975), as being far too rigid and not accounting for many problems in
comprehension. On the other hand, Schank and Abelson have specified their
comprehension procedures to a far greater extent than have those advocating
schemata. It is not at all clear how one would write other schemata, even
another plot structure, nor how any of its claimed virtues would be
implemented.
3.2 Necessary Inferences
The notion that drawing inferences is necessary for comprehending a
passage has been getting more attention in the last few years (e.g.,
Charniak, 1972; Clark, 1975; Frederiksen, 1977; Paris, 1975; Rieger, 1974;
Schank and Abelson, 1975; Trabasso and Nicholas, 1977). Most of these
papers demonstrate the importance of world knowledge and the drawing of
inferences by presenting example stories and showing what inferences were
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necessary for comprehension. The papers by Clark, Rieger, and Trabasso and
Nicholas actually present classifications of necessary inferences. Clark's
work will be discussed in detail because he also presents empirical data to
support some of his claims.
3.2.1 Clark
Clark (1975) and Clark and Haviland (1976) focus their analysis of in-
ferences on those they call "authorized inferences." These inferences are
called "authorized inferences" to indicate that they are intended by the
speaker, or "backward inferences" to indicate that they are to connect the
current sentence with previous ones. Many of the notions Clark and
Haviland discuss are based on Grice's (1975) Co-operative Principle. One
aspect of this principle concerns finding the intended antecedent that
allows comprehension of the current statement. Finding the antecedent
sometimes involves "bridging" or the drawing of inferences by the compre-
hender. Clark (1975) describes a number of types of briding, some of which
are described below.
One form of bridging is determining reference. There are many ways in
which this can be done. An interesting way is by means of epithet. An
example of an epithetic reference is: "I met a man yesterday. The bastard
wanted to stop all governmental support of education." Epithets are
restricted in use; "the bastard" could not be replaced by "the doctor."
Another type of bridging involves inferring information about something
previously mentioned. This also may resolve reference. If one reads "I
walked into the room. The ceiling was very high," it is easily inferred
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that "ceiling" refers to the ceiling of the room since it is a necessary
part of the room. However, if one reads, "I walked into the room. The
chandeliers sparkled brightly," the idea that the room has chandeliers has
been induced; this time the bridge has conveyed new information. Chandeliers
are not a standard attribute in a "room frame."
Sometimes the bridge, i.e., the number of inferences involved in
making a connection, can be longer than in the above examples. From the set
of sentences "John is a Republican. Mary is slightly daft, too," the
implications would be: all Republicans are slightly daft; therefore, John
is slightly daft. (Some people also infer that Mary is Republican,
although that implication is less clear.) Those are both needed as antece-
dents to the "given information" that someone other than Mary is slightly
daft. The number of inferences the listener assumes he should make to
bridge the sentences is the minimal number. There are, undoubtedly, a
large number of paths of inferences that could connect two sentences. The
comprehender must use the rule of finding the shortest path; otherwise,
comprehension would take a long time, and there would not be a unique set
of antecedents for a sentence that could be intended by the speaker.
There have been a number of experiments which support the notion that
the time to comprehend a sentence is affected by the number of inferences
that need to be drawn to do so, (Clark & Haviland, 1976; Clark, 1975).
Some sentences that subjects read were preceded by a direct antecedent,
others by an indirect antecedent. Comprehension of the identical sentence
was faster when preceded by the direct antecedent. For example, subjects
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were faster to comprehend the second sentence in "Fran took the beer out
of the car. The beer was warm," than in "Fran took the picnic supplies
out of the car. The beer was warm" or in "Fran likes beer. The beer
was warm" (the last being a control for the word "beer").
Clark also makes the important distinction between backward and forward
inferences and authorized and unauthorized inferences. Forward inferences
are unauthorized (not demanded by the speaker) and are indeterminate in
number (i.e., there is no minimal number rule). These are elaborations or
embellishments of the input in the text. Backward inferences that are
authorized and follow the minimal number rule are the bridges described
above. Unauthorized, backward inferences follow from statements such as
Nixon's "I am not a crook." In this case, the speaker did not intend the
implication that there is reason to consider that he might be a crook.
3.2.2 Schank's Model for Drawing Inferences
Clark's paper implies that there are very few and often only one back-
ward inference to be made per sentence. However, Schank's model for
sentence comprehension and for paragraph comprehension (Schank, 1972, 1973,
1975a) suggests that many such inferences are made. These backward infer-
ences tend to concern presupposition and enabling conditions. The fact
that a large number of inferences need to be made has always seemed to be
one of the weakest aspects of Schank's early models. Schank (1972, 1973)
asserted in his papers on conceptual dependence (sentence parsing) that
during comprehension the verb is decomposed into its semantic primitives.
Decomposition includes inferring the instrument of action when the verb
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is one that "takes" an instrument. Even in sentences where the instrument
is explicitly stated, more implicit instruments may need to be inferred
recursively. For example, the conceptual dependency representation of the
instrument in "Fred hit Bill with a stick" would be that "Fred did some-
thing with a stick,"and the instrument for that would be that "Fred grabbed
the stick" which implies that "Fred moved his hand toward the stick" and
so on.7
In a similar vein, Rieger (1974) a student of Schank, developed a
scheme in which a seemingly limitless number of "real world inferences"
would be made during comprehension. As he states:
When the current (Conceptual Memory) is turned loose,
it will often generate upwards of 100 inferences from
a fairly banal stimulus such as "John gave Mary the
book." (p. 31)
Rieger described a large number of classes of inferences (16) which include
specification, resultative, causative, motivational, enabling, knowledge
propagation (inferring what other knowledge an actor must know), and norma-
tive inferences. He believes there are even more classes he did not identi-
fy and that all these classes generate spontaneous inferences seeking out
relevant context. Rieger does give some notions about how the prolifera-
tion of inferences will be cut off, but these are not worked out.
Schank (1975a) uses many of these same inference classes in a paper on
paragraph comprehension. One motivation for Schank's decision to develop
representations for paragraphs was that sentence comprehension involved the
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generation of too many inferences; embedding a sentence in a paragraph
limits the number of relevant inferences. He feels that in paragraph
comprehension, one only needs to generate those inferences that will
connect sentences of the story together; one must find enabling conditions,
i.e., causal chains that allow an event to occur. He distinguishes between
absolutely and reasonably necessary conditions (ANCs and RNCs, respectively).
Examples of ANCs for the phrase "John began to mow his lawn" would be John
having a lawn, possessing a lawn mower, John being alive, etc. Reasonably
necessary conditions would be that it is not cold, nor rainy, nor is there
any snow on the ground, etc. None of these conditions need to be stated
in the paragraph that includes the phrase. All these statements could be
satisfied by "normality assumptions." If the ANCs can be satisfied by
"normality assumptions," one only checks to be sure that none of these
assumptions are violated by some other assertion in the paragraph.
3.3 Scripts, Plans and Goals
Schank and Abelson (1975; 1977; Abelson, 1975) proposed that people
utilize situation-specific knowledge, called scripts, in order to make
inferences and determine if something seems plausible or reasonable in a
particular context. Normality assumptions will vary from context to con-
text (or script to script). The model that uses scripts is implemented in
a computer program that summarizes, paraphrases, and translates stories
(Schank, 1975b). It can also answer questions about the story concerning
what happened, when did something happen and why did it happen.
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In addition to scripts, which capture the essence of a stereotyped
sequence of actions or events for a well-known situation, there are other
comprehension mechanisms such as plans. Plans handle novel situations.
Plans describe the set of choices associated with accomplishing a goal.
When a plan is frequently implemented, it becomes a script. Most people do
not have a "how to become president" script or a "what to do when the house
burns down" script but could implement a plan. An example of a script
common to most Americans is a restaurant script. Consider (1) below:
(1) John went into a restaurant. He ordered a hamburger and a
coke. He asked the waitress for the check and left.
Many aspects of this standard script have been omitted, but are automatically
inferred. If the reader of (1) were asked at a delay "Did John eat a ham-
burger?" the response would probably be "yes," although that was never
explicitly stated. One way to tell if an episode is a situational script
is by use of the "reference test" (Schank, 1975c). When a definite article
precedes a noun not previously mentioned, it is probably acceptable because
the referents have been implicitly introduced by the script. Compare (2)
and (3):
(2) John went to a restaurant. He asked the waitress to tell the
chef to cook him a hot dog.
(3) John went to a restaurant. He struck up a conversation with the
bus driver.
In (3) we would feel uncomfortable using "the" with bus driver and might try
to augment the script to explain the anomaly.
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Scripts are a set of scenes and within each scene there is a causal
chain such that each action enables the next. For example, in the
restaurant script, asking for the check enables the patron to receive the
check. Many parts of a script can be modified and, in fact, frequently are.
There are only a few aspects of a script, e.g., ingesting food, which are
considered critical. Often there are deviations. Consider scenario (4):
(4) John went to a restaurant. He ordered a hamburger. It was
cold when the waitress brought it. He left her a very small
tip.
Since there are two deviations from the typical script, viz., "cold" and
'"very small," the processor would hypothesize that the deviations are
related. In general, however, deviations from scripts are handled by
"what if" or "whifs" associated with every situational script.
Even though we do not have scripts for every situation encountered
in a story, we do need relevant conceptual structure to understand a given
input and infer the appropriate connections. Consider the following passage:
(5) John knew his wife's operation would be very expensive. There
was always Uncle Harry...he reached for the suburban phone book.
It is unlikely that we have a "paying for an operation" script, yet we might
have a "raising money for important expenditures" script. That is, the com-
prehension of (5) in terms of inferences made would not be very different if
"son's education" were substituted for "wife's operation." In each case
there is a general goal state. Trying to achieve a goal involves a plan.
A plan is a series of actions that will hopefully realize a goal. Much
like the General Problem Solver (Newell & Simon, 1972), plans to achieve the
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goal state go through intermediate states, trying to reduce differences
between the goal state and current state. Plans consist of a set of
"deltacts," actions or subplans. When a set of actions is used often
enough together, the set becomes a script. Examples of general purpose sub-
goals used to achieve a desired state are: D-CONT--a change in the control
of an object; D-KNOW--a change in what an actor knows; D-PROX--a change in
the proximity relations of objects and actors. Actions that are part of a
chain involved in a particular action used for a general purpose belong to
a "planbox." Certain plans may invoke a planbox to satisfy a goal. For
example, in order to gain control of an object (D-CONT) one might first ask
a person for it, bargain for it, threaten a person for it, steal it, or over-
power a person in order to take it. Each of these actions involve a number
of prerequisites and result in changes of state if the actions succeed.
The preconditions that the actor can affect (e.g., one must be "near" the
person one is going to ask, or at least physically capable of asking) as
well as the resulting state changes are listed in the planbox.
Sometimes in the middle of a story, the actions that a character is pur-
suing will be frustrated and there will be an abrupt shift in plans. In
order to better understand why the actor would shift from the one activity
to another, Schank and Abelson described a theory of goal substitution, goal
forms, goal initiations, etc. When the system cannot find an appropriate
script, it tries to induce what the character's plans would be using the goal
monitor. In addition to keeping track of the motivating influence of the
character's goals, the monitor must recognize when a goal has been triggered,
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makes predictions about what events will be caused by it and keeps track
of a goal's fate.
In Schank and Abelson's system, the representation of a story has
three levels of description: (1) the lowest level is conceptual dependency
(CD), described earlier; (2) main conceptualizations, (MAINCONS), describe
the important aspects of a scene and of a script; (3) the highest level is
the knowledge structure (KS) which has the script, plan or theme informa-
tion. The CD level is in some ways similar to Kintsch and van Dijk's micro-
structure, while the MAINCONS are like the macro-structure. MAINCONS
generate expectations. The three levels are connected by pointers. Like
Kintsch and van Dijk and others, Schank and Abelson do not think the lowest
level is involved in summarizing. Schank has also predicted that items most
likely to be forgotten are those that are at "dead ends" in causal chains.
However, unlike Kintsch and van Dijk, Schank has never empirically tested
his ideas.
A major weakness of script theory is devising a reasonable scheme for
evoking a script-- how does the program know if a script is the correct one?
Sometimes several scripts seem appropriate concurrently (e.g., a restaurant
script and a romance script). There is no mechanism that allows both scripts
to be operating and to make predictions at the same time, let alone inter-
act. These difficulties are not unique to script theory. All extant theories
that rely on "bundles" of knowledge to help direct inferences and expecta-
tions (e.g., frames and schemata) share the same dilemma. Scripts are
currently instantiated when a key phrase has been mentioned (e.g., John went
to a restaurant) and a line fitting the script has been mentioned. Most of
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the script recognition task has been delegated to the scripts themselves.
Others working on simulations have also alluded to procedures attached to
schemata that are evoked in the appropriate context so that the relevant
schema or script is activated. The workability of these notions remains to
be tested in implementation.
3.4 The Script-Elaboration Model
The script model described above was described in most detail because
it is the processing model with the most promise, in my opinion. The script-
elaboration model, a hybrid, borrows heavily from Schank and Abelson's work,
as the name implies. The essential difference between this hybrid and the
original is the emphasis on the role of elaborative processing. Some of
the problems with Schank and Abelson's model discussed above are not solved
by these modifications. Nonetheless, the assumption that the reader makes
many embellishments during reading has a great deal of psychological plaus-
ability and accounts for a large body of data that would otherwise be diffi-
cult to explain.
Elaborations are generated that are consistent with the script invoked,
but not necessarily true. Consider the following sub-passage.
(6) Bill took Joanne to a steak and ale place, not very fancy
but all he could afford. Joanne tried to study the menu
intently while Bill gazed at her.
If this were the beginning of a story, i.e., the reader had no prior
knowledge about Bill or Joanne, a number of inferences and elaborations would
probably occur to the reader. References to "a steak and ale place" and
Comprehension and Retention of Prose
71
"menu" would call up a restaurant script and various inferences would be
added to the story structure such as Bill and Joanne were shown to a table,
given menus by the hostess or waitress, etc. The reader might also imagine
the restaurant as being semi-dark, that they were seated in a booth, that
the table had placemats rather than a tablecloth, that Bill was infatuated
with Joanne, that Joanne was somewhat embarrassed by Bill's infatuation,
that this story was a romance story, etc. Another reader might have
another set of elaborations entirely, differing in the nature of what was
embellished or how it was embellished. Elaborations tend to be highly
idiosyncratic, based on one's prior experience with related situations or
similar stories.
Elaborations occur at many levels. They can be embellishments of phys-
ical descriptions of characters' personalities, imputing goals or intentions
to the author, etc. Low level elaborations are generated by accessing from
long-term memory salient exemplars of concepts referenced in the story.
That is, as each word in a story is read, the corresponding concept in
memory may be activated which, in turn, evokes associations to the concept.
The instance of a concept stored in memory that would be used to embellish
the story will be the most common instance that is consistent with the
context described in the story. A "consistent" instance is one that has
occurred in context similar to the one described in the story or assumed
for the story. The contexts in which exemplars have occurred is also stored
in memory.
The generation of elaborations is similar to processes used when scripts
are employed to aid comprehension. In both cases, past experience is used
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to understand a current situation and in both cases, more information is
added to the memory representation of the story. The difference between
inferences that represent the omitted main conceptualizations of a script
and elaborations is two-fold: Any omitted script action is likely to be
inferred, and the default value for the omission (i.e., the inference) is
likely to be similar across readers. On the other hand, the number of
elaborations generated varies greatly with circumstance and the content of
elaborations varies across readers. How much one elaborates depends upon
previous experience with the material, inherent interest in the subject
matter, understanding of the text, time allotted to read it, concentration
and general tendency to elaborate.
Since elaborations are only moderately plausible and are optional, one
might ask why people generate elaborations and since they are not necessary,
why one should include them in a comprehension model. They serve a number
of basic functions, namely, finding connections among sentences, generating
expectations about subsequent input, detecting anomalies and aiding retention.
Consider the pairs of sentences below:
(7) A West Haven car salesman realized on Thursday that he had not
sold many cars all month. The next day, he shot his wife.
(8) A West Haven car salesman realized on Thursday that he had not
sold many cars all month. On Friday, a West Haven bank was
robbed.
In the first case, elaborations would help establish a "motive," which one
might consider a higher level connection. In the second example (8), most
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readers would infer that the salesman was the robber, and elaborations are
needed to appreciate exactly why he did it. The reader does not typically
stop at finding connections between potentially related sentences. He will
also speculate on resulting actions, consequences and future problems. In
(7) one might expect the salesman to go on trial or go into hiding. In
(8) one might expect to hear how he spends the money, how he evades being
caught or how he is discovered, etc. In other words, the reader generates
expectations concerning subsequent input that severely restricts the original
class of possible inputs. Occasionally one is wrong, but for the most part,
there are large savings in comprehension time.
Elaborations may also help to detect anomalies. Assertions within a
passage may not be in direct contradiction with one another, but the elabor-
ations evoked by the sentences may be inconsistent. Consider (9):
(9) Alice went to Jimmy's house for lunch. Jimmy's mother served
them tuna fish sandwiches. Alice liked her sandwich very much
and had almost finished it when all of a sudden, her dentures
fell out of her mouth.
Although (9) seems anomalous, there is nothing in the passage that is inher-
ently contradictory. Elaborations generated to it, however, might be in
direct conflict. For instance, part of my elaborations involved Alice having
the smooth skin of a young girl. Then when I imagined dentures falling out,
I elaborated a wrinkled face with an old mouth and exposed gums. The anomaly
was detected by noting the contradiction of these two facial features.
There are of course many other sets of inferences that would also contradict.
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Perhaps the most important aspect of the process of elaboration is the
benefit to long term retention of the input. Any particular proposition is
fragile and may become irretrievable at test. However, if an input proposi-
tion had been richly elaborated during reading, then only a few of the
redundant propositions need be retrieved at recall to infer the gist of the
original input. Suppose, for example, that a reader elaborates passage (6)
as follows: "I imagine that the steak and ale place looks a little like
Stickney's Restaurant. Perhaps Joanne only pretends to be engrossed by the
menu because she is embarrassed by Bill's attentiveness..." etc. Even if
the reader could not recall any of the input propositions, he would still
have a good chance of recalling the gist of the passage from recalled elabora-
tive fragments. This reconstructive view of memory is not unlike that ad-
vocated by Bartlett (1932).
3.5 Experimental Evidence in Support of the Elaboration Theory
From the point of view of providing strong empirical support for the
elaboration theory, a serious problem is that the amount and direction of
elaboration are difficult to manipulate. Nonetheless, there are a number of
experiments concerning selectivity in memory for prose which are consistent
with an elaboration-plus-reconstruction viewpoint. If subjects have more
ability to make certain types of elaborations than others or if subjects are
directed to make certain elaborations rather than others, one should see
better memory for material consistent with the preferred elaboration and
more distortioh of material in the direction of the preferred elaboration.
Comprehension and Retention of Prose
75
In the classic study conducted by Bartlett (1932), subjects from pre-World
War I England studied a northwest coast Indian story, "The War of the Ghosts."
Bartlett obtained what he interpreted as systematic distortion of the
material in the direction of the knowledge of his subjects. This distortion
took the form of additions to the material that made the story more consis-
tent with the world view of his subjects, deletion of inconsistent informa-
tion, and transformations of inconsistent information to make it more con-
sistent with prevailing beliefs.
There has been a long history of debates (e.g., Gould & Stephenson,
1967; Anderson & Bower, 1973; Spiro, 1975) over the extent to which Bartlett's
subjects were really misremembering and the degree to which they were
knowingly confabulating in response to perceived task demands. It seems
that, at least to some degree, subjects are aware of their distortions
and are able to assign lower confidence to these than to veridical recalls.
However, this debate misses an important point: The behavior of subjects
in Bartlett's task is typical of prose processing. Normally, the reader does
not make distinctions between what was actually read in a passage and what
is a plausible inference. With most stories the inferences made are
plausible extentions of the story and are not distortions. It was Bartlett's
clever story selection that served to highlight the elaborative behavior of
subjects. The experiments described earlier by Sulin and Dooling (1974)
and Dooling and Christiaansen (1977) that showed greater confusion to themati-
cally related foils suggest that distortion can occur as a reconstructive
process or as an encoding process.
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Bower (1976) reports an interesting experiment looking at the effect of
prior information on subjects' memory for a passage. Subjects were given
a story that consisted of episodes. Half of the subjects were given prior
information that would suggest an unusual interpretation of some of the sub-
passages. For instance, subjects might be told that the main character (a
college co-ed) had just found out that she was pregnant. The story follows
the heroine through five episodes: making a cup of coffee in the morning,
visiting a doctor, attending a lecture, going shopping in a grocery store,
and attending a cocktail party. The meaning of these episodes can be very
different depending on whether or not we view the heroine as pregnant.
Subjects given the interesting interpretation recalled many more infer-
ences appropriate to the pregnancy theme. However, they also recalled more
of those episodes related to the theme. This result is what would be expect-
ed if subjects had used the information about pregnancy to elaborate. These
elaborations should make the text information more redundant and introduce
additional inferences.
Hayes (Note 1) has found a similar correlation between number of
intruded inferences and overall memory for text. Hayes and his colleagues
tried to find out what mechanisms allow some people to remember more than
others. They pre-tested subjects on their memory for various historical
facts and then classified them as those who remember a lot of history and
those that do not. The subjects were then given a fictitious history passage
to read. The same subjects who knew more veridical history performed better
on a test of the fantasy history passage. Subjects were also asked to free
recall the passage that they had read. Not only did the subjects with better
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history memory recall more, they also "recalled" many elaborations that were
not asserted. These elaborations were not simple paraphrases of the passage,
nor were they simple inferences. The subjects classified as having poor
memory for history offered almost no elaborations. From this finding,
Hayes conjectured that embellishing the input with elaborations promotes
better retention.
Schallert (1976) indirectly provides evidence consistent with the
notion that elaborations help retention and that the amount of elaboration
generated can be influenced by instruction. Subjects were given ambiguous
passages that were either biased by prior information or were not biased.
She found that subjects in the biased group remembered more information con-
sistent with the bias than those who did not receive prior information. She
also introduced a "depth of processing" manipulation in which subjects either
processed the sentence at a "shallow" level (counting four letter words in
the passage) or at a "deep" level (rating for ambiguity). Biased subjects
were more likely to remember consistent information when they were processing
the material at the semantic level. It is reasonable to assume that subjects
would be generating more elaborations under semantic orienting instructions
(see Anderson and Reder, in press), and the hybrid model would claim that
elaborations are responsible for the bias found in recall. Therefore, one
would expect to find a greater bias in recall for the "deep" processing group.
In other words, Schallert's data support the notion of elaborative processing
in comprehension because of the interaction of mode of processing and bias.
Brown, Smiley, Day, Townsend, and Lawton (1977) conducted a study with
children that supports the elaboration theory by showing that the types of
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elaborations generated can be manipulated and that generating more elabora-
tions improves recall. The study indicates that if teachers provide
students with background knowledge, students are likely to remember more of
the material presented to them. In the Brown et al. study, children in
various grades were presented with information about a ficitious tribe
called the "Targa" or learned about people from Spain. Those who learned
about the Targa were either told that the tribe consisted of Eskimos or
desert Indians. A week later all groups read a story about a young boy
from the Targa tribe, and no mention was made about what they had studied
the preceding week. Of those receiving relevant background information,
intrusions and biases in interpretations of ambiguous sentences were con-
sistent with the orientation given earlier. More important, those subjects
in the Spanish control recalled significantly less of the veridical material.
The usefulness of the background material was evident at all age levels.
However, not only did older children recall significantly more veridical
information, they recalled significantly more elaborations (had more intru-
sions) consistent with the background material. In other words, both recall
and number of elaborations increased with age.
Owens and Bower (1977) conducted a study that indicates how perspective
on a passage can affect memory for the input. Other studies discussed
earlier manipulated prior knowledge about concepts in the passage or manipu-
lated the focus of attention by the questions asked during reading. This
study was more subtle in that the first few lines of the story caused the
reader to identify with one character or the other, depending on which
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character was introduced first. Mishaps were described in the story without
specifying who was to blame for the accidents. On a subsequent recognition
test, subjects were asked to judge which statements were presented in the
story. Subjects were much more inclined to false alarm to a statement that
imputed blame for the mishap to the character with whom they did not identi-
fy, and much less likely to false alarm to statements putting fault on the
character with whom they did identify. Similar results have been obtained
by Abelson (1976) and Anderson and Pichert (1977). These results are con-
sistent with the notion that readers elaborate material in a fashion that is
consistent with their wishes, prejudices or perspective. And there is, of
course, some tendency to confuse elaborations with presented input.
In a study of mine (Reder, 1976), I manipulated more directly the
amount of elaboration given to prose material. An earlier study of mine
indicated that subjects have very good memory for the sentences used in the
same experimental stories. So, the dependent measure chosen was the speed
with which subjects can make judgments about a story, not the accuracy. The
task demanded of subjects was to make plausibility judgments, which seems to
resemble everyday tasks more than verbatim memory judgments. Three factors
were manipulated orthogonally. With the use of the additive factors logic,
i determined that subjects do not search for a specific fact, but rather for
a set of propositions that will be relevant for judging plausibility. The
speed with which these propositions become available is a function of the
number of elaborations generated.
Just as the number of relevant elaborations is postulated to affect re-
tention of the input, amount of relevant elaborations is thought to affect
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the speed of retrieval of relevant information. This notion is based on
the assumption that searching through memory for relevant information takes
time and that the greater the proportion of relevant to irrelevant, infor-
mation the faster a useful or relevant fact can be found; hence, faster RTs
occur with more elaborations. (See Reder, 1976, for a fuller discussion.)
3.6 Discussion
The approaches represented in this last section differ from others in
a number of respects. First, artificial intelligence models are either im-
plemented on a computer or are purported to be sufficiently specified to be
implemented. Second, the models in this section tend to be more concerned
with the reader's use of world knowledge than the use of knowledge of
language to understand a passage.
Both of these qualities make the models in this last section important
advances. When models are implemented, inherent weaknesses in them and
issues that were overlooked are quickly brought into focus: A bad program
will not run or will produce the "wrong" behavior. In other words, a program
serves as a check on the viability of the model that generated it. On the
other hand, sometimes the motivation for a particular feature of a model may
be computational ease, and the feature may not seem psychologically plausible.
Often when computer implementations of models do not work properly, patches
are made to the program to make them work. When more and more patches are
added to the program, it begins to seem very ad hoc. It also becomes incom-
prehensible as a model. The modifications to the program tend to have no
psychological plausibility whatsoever. Furthermore, Al models are not
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always programmed and thus one has neither empirical support nor a computer
implementation as confirmation of their viability.
The second advantage of these models, the concern with world knowledge,
is unrelated to the issue of whether a model is implemented. My only reser-
vation here concerns the apparent unequal treatment of world knowledge and
linguistic knowledge. It seems that some theories are only concerned with
the plausibility of the former. The result is that the parser is full of
special purpose rules to handle the set of sentences to be processed and
they have no relation to linguistic theory nor any generality.
Despite these criticisms, I feel the research in this section is the
most commendable. It incorporates world knowledge and is concerned with
processing the input, not merely representing it. The most useful theories
will be those that predict (1) what information will be best retained from
a story, and (2) how to improve a reader's memory for and comprehension of
a passage. Approaches concerned with story grammars seem less able to
address (2).
The story grammar theories and the processing models share a common
flaw: none seem to generalize to many texts or stories. If these theories
are to have practical application to education (or even be of more theoreti-
cal interest), they must strive to handle a larger class of prose. Hope-
fully, the complexity of a model will not keep pace with increases in
generality.
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4. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR EDUCATION
To some extent, the research discussed in this review has implications
for the more applied questions with which we began. For instance, in order
to test the facilitation of advance organizers one needs a model of the
structure of the text. The thought is that prior exposure to high level
concepts will facilitate retention of lower level concepts. There is enough
similarity among the grammars described so that one could fairly easily
determine which propositions in a text are "high level concepts" and which
are "low level concepts."
The processing models, especially the script-elaboration model can
explain many of the results concerned with asking questions to improve sub-
sequent performance. From Hayes' data, we learned that there may be inher-
ent differences among readers such that good readers elaborate more than
poor readers. However, there is also evidence that the extent to which one
elaborates can be manipulated by experimenters (or teachers) and consequently
8
affect performance. Research by Frase, Rothkopf and others, reviewed
earlier, demonstrates that asking certain questions at specific times can
improve performance. Reder (1976) also found that asking either the same
question or a different one that focused attention improved performance
substantially in terms of latency to respond. The reaction time advantage
for a focusing question over no question increases with delay of final test.
The increase in advantage for the focusing questions over delay is to be
expected if one assumes that retention of input deteriorates with time.
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Schallert's data provides indirect evidence of how different demands on
students during study will result in different memory. And Bower's result
indicates that teachers should try to make a passage more interesting by
relating it to something students already know about. Of course, determining
what is "interesting" to a given student is another problem.
The story grammar research also indicates that passages must be "readable"
for adequate comprehension and retention. Readability in this context is
defined as conformity with the grammar. Work such as Meyer's demonstrates
that any point that the author considers important must be integrated in
such a way that it is high in the underlying structure that represents the
passage. She also showed that merely "flagging" or "signaling" a fact as
important is not nearly as effective at insuring its retention.
There is a consensus among researchers studying prose comprehension that
much of what is intended by the author is implicit in the passage and that
explicit statements in the text are not of equal importance. In order to
improve comprehension, then, three major sub-goals must be achieved: (a)
train students to automatically infer the implicit information intended that
is likely to be necessary for comprehension of subsequent input; (b) teach
students to isolate those aspects of the text that seem important and
elaborate upon them at the expense of full attention on aspects that seem of
less consequence; (c) insure that students have sufficient knowledge of the
concepts referred to in the passage so that they can draw required infer-
ences and further elaborate the input. They should learn to recognize when
they do not have enough background knowledge and must read something else
first.
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The first two goals require that a student learn new procedures. The
last requirement concerns declarative knowledge rather than procedural. It
is not clear which type of knowledge would be easier to convey. Nor is it
by any means certain that cognitive science can offer any novel advice on
how to improve these skills or transmit the requisite declarative knowledge.
One major difference between good and poor readers is the speed with
which they make inferences and elaborations. Assuming that making these
inferences is a skill like any other, the most effective way for a person
to be faster at the skill is to practice it over and over. I speculate that
skills involved in listening to stories are the same skills that determine
reading performance in upper grades. That is, most reading problems have
nothing to do with initial processing (perception) of the input. Therefore,
children could get a lot of practice at the verbal skills of drawing infer-
ences and elaborating if parents would read stories to them frequently.
Watching television gives relatively little practice in the verbal skills
that will be necessary for reading.
4.1 Summing Up
This literature review has stressed the need for more attention to the
elaborative aspects of comprehension. The inferences and elaborations that
are made during comprehension should be reflected in a structure that is
intended to represent how a passage is stored in memory, and a mechanism
should be specified for how these inferences are made and why they are made.
The hybrid model proposed is only a skeleton of a complete theory of prose
comprehension. The exact structure of scripts, how scripts are related in
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memory, what other memory structures exist, how representations of stories
are stored, etc. all need to be further specified.
Despite the sketchiness of the hybrid model, there are a number of con-
clusions that can be made that should be of interest to anyone involved in
the theory of or application to prose comprehension. A person's compre-
hension and memory for a passage can be affected by a number of manipulations.
The "inherent" differences among readers seems to reflect, in part, differ-
ential propensities to elaborate; nevertheless, educators should continue
to try to influence the extent of elaboration during reading. Experiments
have shown that certain questions asked in the appropriate position can
influence the memory for certain facts. Prior knowledge, and inherent
interest in the subject matter, orienting instructions, etc. can also affect
retention and comprehension.
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There have been a few notable exceptions. For example, the psychologist
Cofer (1941), demonstrated that it is easier to recall the gist of a long
passage than to recall it verbatim; and Gomulicki (1956) found that subjects
are more likely to free recall the agent and action phrases than the less
important, modifying segments.
There is an interpretation of these remarks with which 1 do not wish
to be associated. A common position of late is that the "correct" domain to
work in is prose processing or, even more specifically, "story" processing;
that working with more "impoverished" material leads to distortions of the
normal processing. This point of view and the methodological imperialism
it leads to is nonsense. The human engages in a wide variety of behavior.
There is no reason to believe that story comprehension of the kind currently
in vogue is more representative of normal processes than is free recall.
In fact, there are probably more adult behaviors (e.g., remembering a grocery
list) that come close to a free recall experiment than adult behaviors that
come close to reading one of the very simple stories typically employed. It
seems silly to regard any paradigm as prototypical. A theorist may miss
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important generalities in human behavior if the tasks studied are restricted
to a narrow paradigm.
Letter identification,'word identification, phonetic coding, etc. are
important aspects of reading, but how they are performed is not addressed
in this review. It has been shown (Smiley, Oakley, Worthen, Campione &
Brown, 1977; Anderson & Biddle, 1975) that the differences between good
readers and poor readers maintain regardless of the input modality of the
message to be retained--visual or verbal. Many people's problems with reading
are not ones of encoding but of comprehension which they would have whether
they listened to the message or read it.
This improvement, however, may be due to guessing since they used a
cued recall procedure that required subjects to fill in the missing words of
statements. Since the subject easily remembers the recently presented
"topic," the additional recall cue may allow him to infer the original fact.
A control condition would have been useful in which subjects who never saw
the original sentences tried to "recall" to the "retrieval cues."
5Although the conclusion offered by Kintsch et al. may be correct, the
statistics performed on the data do not warrant this conclusion. They have
merely failed to reject the null hypothesis at the two longest delays. The
appropriate test would have been to assume, as the null hypothesis, no diff-
erence between explicit and implicit inferences over time, i.e., assume the
functions to be parallel across delay. If they found an interaction between
delay and explicit vs. implicit, they would be more justified in their
conclus ion.
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Bobrow and Winograd (1977) have developed a language called KRL
(Knowledge Representation Language) that is supposed to recognize instances
of a schema. The details of how this is accomplished have not been given,
nor are the limitations of the program known.
At a Sloan sponsored workshop at Yale in June, 1978, Schank indicated
that his position on decomposition has been modified. He now believes there
exist "primitives" at many different levels. One need not unpack a verb
down to the original "primitive acts" postulated by Schank. I find the
notion of different levels of primitives somewhat disconcerting. Perhaps
primitives now mean "concepts."
One should not conclude from these remarks that teachers have not al-
ready been encouraging behaviors that seem consistent with these findings
(Frase, 1975). The PQ4R method (Thomas & Robinson, 1972) is used by many
reading specialists. This method encourages the reader to a) preview,
b) make up salient questions, c) read the text, d) reflect upon it, e) recite
it, and f) review it. Previewing is intended to allow the student to better
allocate his processing time when the material is read more carefully. Asking
questions about the text prior to reading is intended to help the subject
better attend to important aspects of the material. The data reviewed here,
however, indicates that time is better spent "reflecting" upon the material,
that is, answering questions afterwards. Much more work needs to be done in
the field of reading research before more specific proposals can replace or
clarify this method.
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